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Americans historically have supported efforts to provide
financial assistance to the truly needy members of our society.
Indeed, we believe that the government has a duty to give the
"deserving" poor enough to help them pull themselves up by their
bootstraps and become economically sufficient. We have a long-
standing, deep-seated fear, however, that giving cash or other forms
of economic assistance to the unemployed but able-bodied is morally
corrupting and fosters economic dependency. Thus, while we are
happy to give economic assistance to the "truly needy," we want to
make sure that none of the assistance goes to the "merely greedy."'
* Associate Professor of Law, William and Mary Law School. I am grateful to
Professors Veryl Miles and Beverly Moran for the in-depth review and suggestions they
provided during a works-in-progress session during the First National Meeting of the
Regional People of Color Legal Scholarship Conferences ("POC") on March 27, 1999.
This paper benefited from comments made by other participants at the POC conference
and by Dean Kent Syverud and other attendees at a workshop at the Southeastern
Conference of the American Association of Law Schools Conference on July 24, 1998. I
also thank my colleagues Professors Peter Alces, Jayne Barnard, Charles Koch, and John
Levy for their criticism and advice.
This project would not have been possible without the diligence and dedication of two
research assistants, Christine Lewis and John McDonald. This project was supported, in
part, by a grant provided by the College of William and Mary.
1. See R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS
259 (1994) ("Like most citizens, members of Congress want to help the 'truly needy'
without rewarding the 'merely greedy'; to promote 'family values' while protecting the
privacy of [welfare] recipients; to promote work without forcing those unable to work to
take a job.").
Recent efforts to overhaul welfare and bankruptcy laws resulted
from the public's perception that too many people failed to become
economically self-sufficient during this country's extended peacetime
period of economic prosperity. Congress sought to reform the
systems to ensure that only the deserving poor received welfare
benefits or were allowed to file for bankruptcy. In fact, Congress
ended "welfare as we knew it" in 1996 because of its conclusion that
too many non-working but able-bodied mothers were receiving
welfare benefits, that they were financially dependent because they
were lazy, that lazy people did not deserve welfare benefits, and, that
the best way to force these lazy, able-bodied women to become
economically self-sufficient was to push them off the welfare rolls and
into the work force. Similarly, bills presented in Congress during the
last few years suggest that lawmakers have concluded that too many
able-bodied people are deeply in debt because they used credit
irresponsibly, that these debtors do not deserve the right to discharge
their debts in bankruptcy, and that the best way to force them to
become economically self-sufficient is to make them repay their
debts.
These reform efforts sound reasonable and are politically
popular. Unfortunately, they are unlikely to cure the ills of either
welfare mothers or debtors because reformers fundamentally (and,
perhaps, intentionally) misdefined "the problem." The "problem"
with welfare, critics argued, is that welfare recipients are lazy and
refuse to earn wages to support themselves and their children.2
Welfare reforms then proceeded based on the premise that non-work
created the welfare crisis and that the "solution" to the non-work
problem is to force people into the labor market. This solution
should solve the welfare problem if laziness (as evidenced by non-
work) is the cause of the problem. If, however, the welfare crisis was
caused by the long-term effects of poverty (minimal vocational and
educational skills, limited work opportunities, etc.) not non-work,
then the work solution will not work. Imposing additional work
obligations on people who already work but remain poor will not
make them economically self-sufficient or ensure they will earn
enough to support their families. This solution will simply strip them
of the economic relief they (and their children) need while they
struggle to work their way out of poverty.
Similarly, the "problem" with bankruptcy, critics argued, is that
people live extravagantly, spend irresponsibly, then seek to discharge
their debts in bankruptcy rather than make sacrifices to repay their
bills.3 Critics argued that the "solution" to the irresponsible spending
2- See infra notes 42-56.
3. See infra notes 134-40.
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problem was to make it harder for people to discharge their debts.
This solution should solve the bankruptcy problem if irresponsible
spending caused the problem. If, however, the bankruptcy problem is
caused by factors unassociated with credit (i.e., an increased divorce
rate, lack of health insurance, the globalization of the U.S. economy)
not irresponsible spending, then the solution of preventing debtors
from discharging debts will not work. Telling people to pay their bills
will not make them self-sufficient or ensure that they earn enough to
support their families. The solution will simply force some people to
continue to drown in debt.
This Article examines our society's uneasy relationship with the
working poor and our hesitancy to provide economic relief to able-
bodied people who appear to have contributed to their inability to
support themselves economically. Using the recent legislative efforts
to solve both the welfare and bankruptcy crises as a backdrop,
4 I
argue that attempts to reform bankruptcy laws have been, and will
always be, controversial because society has never been willing to
admit that some employed (or employable) able-bodied people may
need ongoing public economic support.
Part I of the Article discusses the welfare crisis. This Part briefly
describes the historical justifications for providing public economic
assistance. Given the emphasis this country places on individualism
and economic self-sufficiency, only non-able-bodied people were
deemed to be entitled to receive ongoing, long-term financial
assistance from the government. Able-bodied people were deemed
to deserve only short-term public financial support and only if forces
completely beyond their control (i.e., unexpected unemployment or
illness) temporarily prevented them from earning wages to support
themselves. This Part then describes recent federal welfare reforms
and argues that they were driven by the public's belief that most
welfare recipients were lazy, able-bodied women who refused to work
in the market. Having defined the problem as non-work, Congress
decided that the solution to the problem was to force all welfare
mothers to work in the market and to make it hard for all recipients-
even the deserving ones-to receive welfare benefits.
Part II of the Article discusses the bankruptcy crisis. This Part
4. It is unfortunate that both the welfare and bankruptcy systems were cast as
irretrievably broken and beyond repair, rather than splintered and in need of simple
mending. This is not totally surprising, given the tendency of Americans to find fault with
all aspects of a government system and say that the system is "hopelessly corrupt" rather
than just in need of tweaking. See THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL, AMERICA'S
MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE: PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING REALITIES 3
(1990); see also JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, WE THE POOR PEOPLE:
WORK, POVERTY, AND WELFARE 5 (1997) (noting that when welfare became an issue in
the 1992 presidential campaign, it was "[p]redictably labeled a 'crisis"').
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briefly describes the historical views the American public has held
toward people who either could not, or did not, repay their debts.
This Part notes that recent criticisms of, and efforts to reform,
bankruptcy laws assumed that debtors are unwilling (not unable) to
pay their bills and that most of those bills represented irresponsible
credit card use. Having defined the problem as an unwillingness to
pay bills that were incurred irresponsibly, critics concluded that
people would act more responsibly if Congress made it harder for all
potential debtors to discharge their debts by making debtors work to
repay their bills.
Part HI of the Article argues that it is unfair to vilify and
demonize people whose main fault seems to be that they find
themselves unable to move from the ranks of the working poor.
Before "ending bankruptcy as we know it," I argue that Congress
should carefully consider why so many people seem to be unable to
pay their bills during a period of relative economic prosperity.
Relying principally on current labor indicators, this Part suggests that
Congress will find that many people are unable to move from the
ranks of the economically dependent working poor into the ranks of
the economically sufficient due to non-credit-based social factors,
including an unraveling manufacturing economy, inadequate health
care, increased divorce rates (and the corresponding increase in
single-family households), and inefficient child support collection
mechanisms. The Article concludes by arguing that any potential
debtor who can establish that external factors prevent him from being
able to support himself (or his family) financially should be deemed
deserving of bankruptcy relief even if providing the relief appears to
redistribute income from able-bodied economically self-sufficient
workers to the able-bodied, but economically dependent, working
poor.
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I. The Welfare 5 Crisis
A. Historical Justifications for Public Assistance
The public's current ambivalence toward unemployed (but
employable) able-bodied people who claim they need public
assistance can be traced back to the philosophical and ideological
perspectives of some of our country's earliest residents. Many early
settlers and voluntary immigrants in the United States were self-
sufficient, rugged individualists who often came here with nothing.
Part of the American lore is the perception that, with just a little help
from family, friends, neighbors, or church members, people could pull
themselves up by their bootstraps and became economically self-
sufficient, productive members of society.6 Indeed, much of the early
economic relief for the poor was provided by private groups, not the
government.7 Because the private charities had no duty to give aid to
the poor, the charities frequently discriminated between the worthy
poor (those deemed to be the innocent victims of misfortune) and the
unworthy poor (those who were indolent, criminals or substance
abusers).8
Giving public income to people who do not work is deemed to
undermine our market system, which rewards hard work with
income.9  That is, many argue that giving the unworthy or
5. "Welfare" properly defined includes a number of government entitlements or
transfer programs that provide income support and create financial safety nets for the
poor. These programs include Social Security, Medicaid, food stamps, and Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC). Because welfare critics principally targeted AFDC,
"welfare" as discussed in this Article will be limited to AFDC. See JOEL F. HANDLER,
THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 1 (1995) (observing that despite the number of
assistance programs for the poor, critics actually mean AFDC when they say welfare). In
adopting this narrow conceptualization of welfare, I do not adopt the view that AFDC
recipients are solely responsible for the increase in federal government entitlements, for
the problems with the United States budget, or for the decline of civilization as we know
it.
6. See Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethinking "Welfare Dependency" from a Different
Ground, 81 GEO. LJ. 1961, 1967 (1993) ("We are .at ease with the idea of voluntary
charity, with neighbors coming together to give alms to the needy or to raise a barn. But
national level income transfer programs are another matter entirely. It simply makes no
sense, within the country's dominant political creed, for the state to confiscate some
people's hard-earned money to subsidize other people's bad luck, especially if those who
receive the transfer are deemed able to work.").
7. See DAVID KELLEY, A LIFE OF ONE'S OWN: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE
WELFARE STATE 37-38 (1998) (listing relief organizations created along ethnic lines that
served as insurance societies to help shield their members against economic risk).
8. See id. at 37.
9. See William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 1431, 1435 (1986) (noting that redistributing income from workers to dependent
welfare recipients "suggested a breach of the morally fundamental distribution
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undeserving poor economic assistance violates a fundamental tenet of
our American market-based economy: people should be paid based
on the value of work they perform in the market.'0 Characterizing
public welfare assistance as guaranteed income was deemed to create
an immoral economic structure that delegitimizes the distribution of
resources based on market principles." Giving unearned income to
able-bodied but unemployed people was incompatible with the
principle that only people who work hard are entitled to be paid,12
that they should be paid more than people who work less, and that
each individual should strive for economic independence. 3 Under
this market-based view of income entitlement, people are entitled to
income or other economic resources only if they earn money using
their own labor in the market. 14
Characterizing welfare as an "entitlement" or a guaranteed
source of income was also thought to create the moral hazard known
as "welfare opportunism." Welfare opportunism is said to occur
when welfare is treated as a guaranteed economic safety net and the
existence of that net causes potential or actual welfare recipients to
engage in riskier activities because of their knowledge that society
will subsidize or otherwise bear a portion of the costs of those
activities. 5 Having a welfare regime that encourages recipients to
accomplished through the workings of the private law regime of the self-regulating
market").
10. See, e.g., William S. Kern, Current Welfare Reform: A Return to the Principles of
1834, J. ECON. ISSUES 427, 428 (1998) (noting that classical economists demonstrated the
"incompatibility of poor laws with the self-regulating market order and principles of
political economy").
11. See William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L.
REV. 1, 11 (1985) (observing that classical legalists "could not see welfare as a matter of
right because welfare was not consistent with the intermediate distributive premises of
effort and exchange").
12. See id. at 10.
13. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Nature of Dependencies And Welfare
"Reform", 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 287,291 (1996) (characterizing the American society
as one that "mythologizes concepts such as 'self-sufficiency,' 'independence,' and
'autonomy,' and vilifies the concrete indications all around us that these ideals are
unrealizable and unrealistic"); DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE
AMERICAN FAMILY 6 (1988) (noting conflict between public welfare assistance and
societal values of autonomy, responsibility, and work).
14. See Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role of Disability in the Social
Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REV. 361, 370 (1996). Many hold this view despite the fact
that the American government legally sanctioned the acts of early American settlers who
stole or otherwise misappropriated land, minerals, and other economic resources from
Native Americans and who prospered because of the unpaid, involuntary labor of Negro
slaves.
15. See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1393, 1402 (1985); Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of
the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to
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make riskier investments (like, for example, choosing to have more
children even though they are not married) theoretically enhances the
risk of economic failure, distorts the actor's behavior in the direction
of risk taking, and, ultimately increases the cost of welfare. To deter
welfare opportunism and discourage the needy from becoming
economically dependent on the assistance, early forms of public
financial relief provided meager benefits which were administered in
ways designed both to stigmatize the recipients of the relief and to
encourage them to engage in socially desirable behavior, i.e., keep (or
get) a job rather than quit (or not look for) one and apply for public
welfare relief.'6
Given the prevalence of the pul-yourself-up-by-your-bootstraps
mentality, our society generally has been willing to provide
permanent unrestricted economic support only to groups who have a
socially acceptable reason not to work in the market. Thus, though
early public assistance may have provided meager benefits, U.S.
society eventually became willing to provide relatively generous
benefits to groups deemed to have a reason not to work, i.e., the very
young, the very old, and people who have physical or mental
disabilities.17 Although there is no bright-line distinction between
people who have a reason not to work and people who do not work
but are willing to work, and some question whether such distinctions
are necessary, 8 the public has diametrically opposing views toward
Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STuD. 283,286 (1995).
16. See KELLEY, supra note 7, at 35-36 (discussing Elizabethan relief for the poor and
the imposition of workhouses with prisonlike characteristics that were "considered
sufficiently unpleasant to discourage anyone who was capable of working. In that way, it
was hoped, relief would be sought only as a last resort, and only by those who truly needed
it."); HANDLER, supra note 5, at 13-18, 20 (noting early twentieth century views that the
"conditions of [welfare] relief had to be sufficiently miserable and stigmatic as to deter the
working poor. Relief policy was less to reform the poor-who, for the most part could not
work anyway-than to send a message to the working population."); cf MELNICK, supra
note 1, at 129 (describing efforts of the Reagan Administration to "reduce welfare
dependency by imposing norms of work and family responsibility-even if this meant
leaving some families without assistance").
17. See Diller, supra note 14, at 373 (noting that society differentiates between the
"worthy" and "unworthy" poor and that programs that benefit the worthy poor provide
more generous benefits, are more secure, and are more efficiently administered).
Ironically, while people with disabilities may be discriminated against in other contexts,
having a physical or mental disability always has been a favored status in the context of the
social welfare system. The permanently disabled always have been viewed as "deserving"
recipients of public assistance because the public has never doubted that disabled people
have a legitimate excuse not to work. See Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies:
The Tensions Between the Americans with Disabilities Act and Federal Disability Benefit
Programs, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1003, 1014 (1998).
18. See, e.g., Glenn C. Loury, Comment, in WORK AND WELFARE 45, 48-49 (Amy
Gutmann ed. 1998) ("[I]s the distinction between deserving and undeserving-between
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those who have an undeniable excuse for their economic dependence
and those who appear to have no excuse. 19 For example, if jobs are
available, but an able-bodied person seeks financial assistance to
support himself and his family, many will assume that he needs
financial assistance only because he is either lazy or has made a
conscious choice not to support himself. 20 Indeed, the only weak or
dependent able-bodied people that the American society has willingly
embraced are slaves (whose involuntary dependence, weak wills, and
loyalty to their masters was deemed necessary to maintain the social
order), children (who outgrow their weakness and dependency), and
wives (whose subservience and dependency was expected and
demanded in a patriarchal society).2
'good' and 'bad'-poor people a political and moral necessity in our time?").
19. See generally CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE,
POVERTY, AND THE UNDERCLASS 78 (1992) (discussing the legislators' willingness to
generously support the "deserving poor" (children, the elderly, and the disabled) but not
the undeserving poor (single mothers and "marginally employable men whose
unemployment benefits had run out")); cf White, supra note 6, at 1965 ("'[The public,'
just like a large outdated computer, simply cannot process complex social problems except
in one or zero, on or off, black or white terms."); HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 4,
at 21-22 (tracing the distinction in treatment between the deserving poor (those who
cannot work) and the undeserving poor (those who will not work)).
20. That the mainstream American culture expresses hostility toward the idea of
helping the healthy poor is not surprising, as America's first welfare laws appear to be
patterned after early English laws. See William P. Quigley, Backwards into the Future:
How Welfare Changes in the Millenium Resemble English Poor Law of the Middle Ages, 9
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 101, 102-104 (1998). See also HANDLER, supra note 5, at 10
(citing England's Statute of Laborers):
Because that many valiant beggars, as long as they may live of begging, do refuse
to labor, giving themselves to idleness and vice, and sometimes to theft and other
abominations; none upon said pain of imprisonment, shall under the color of pity
or alms, give anything to such, which may labor, or presume to favor them
towards their desires, so that thereby they may be compelled to labor for their
necessary living.
21. See Katherine Hunt Federle, Children, Curfews, and the Constitution, 73 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1315 (1995), where Professor Federle observes that slavery apologists justified the
dependent relationship between slaves and their masters because it "fostered peace and
good will and promoted true affection between slaves and their owners." Id at 1343-44.
She further observes that these apologists compared the relationships men had with other
presumptively dependent people (children and wives) to further support the necessity of
having dependent slaves:
A man loves his children because they are weak, helpless and dependent; he
loves his wife for similar reasons. When his children grow up and assert their
independence, he is apt to transfer his affection to his grand-children. He ceases
to love his wife when she becomes masculine or rebellious; but slaves are always
dependent, never the rivals of their master. Hence, though men are often found
at variance with wife or children, we never saw one who did not like his slaves,
and rarely a slave who was not devoted to his master.
Id. (quoting GEORGE FITZHUGH, SOCIOLOGY FOR THE SOUTH 247 (1850)). See also
HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 4, at 27 (discussing earlier acceptance of wives'
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Though public assistance primarily was designed for the non-able
bodied, our country also has deemed a person to be deserving of
public assistance if he is temporarily prevented from earning a living
because of an unanticipated economic setback caused solely by
external factors, like unexpected illness or sudden, involuntary
unemployment. We are willing to give a limited amount of support to
an able-bodied impoverished person, because we assume that the
person will use this support to pull himself up by his bootstraps and
become self-sufficient. For example, when Congress initially agreed
to provide welfare benefits to mothers it assumed that their financial
need was temporary and would dissipate once they either qualified to
receive social security (or other widows' retirement benefits) based
on their husbands' work or they found a job that paid them enough to
support them and their children.22 Ironically, this assumption proved
to be erroneous as welfare recipients increasingly were divorced or
never-married,23 often had difficulties collecting child support, and
lived in inner cities where high-wage, high-benefit manufacturing jobs
were disappearing. 24 Moreover, even if the mothers did find jobs, the
service jobs that replaced manufacturing jobs in urban areas typically
paid wages at the lower end of the scale, provided few (if any)
benefits, and, thus, made it extraordinarily difficult for mothers to
support their children solely on their own wages.25
dependence because the "patriarchal 'domestic code"' dictated that "proper women
stayed home and took care of their husbands and children").
22. See Peter B. Edelman, Recent Developments Welfare Reform Symposium:
Introduction, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 579, 580 (1998); Gwendolyn Mink, Welfare Reform in
Historical Perspective, 26 CONN. L. REV. 879, 889 (1994); Martha Minow, The Welfare of
Single Mothers and Their Children, 26 CONN. L. REV. 817,824-27 (1994).
23. Between 1940 and the mid-1990s, the percentage of white, widowed AFDC
residents dropped from approximately 85% to less than 40%. Moreover, by the mid-
1990s, half of the AFDC recipients were mothers who had never been married whereas
less than 2% of the recipients were widows. See Dan Bloom, After AFDC: Welfare-to-
Work Choices and Challenges for States 6-7 (1997) (visited 29 June 1999)
http://www.mdrc.aa.psiweb.com/ReportsAfterAFDCtAfter%20AFDC.htm.
24. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY,
THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 174 (1987); Peter B. Edelman, Toward a
Comprehensive Antipoverty Strategy: Getting Beyond the Silver Bullet, 81 GEO. L. J. 1697,
1718 (1993). See generally E. Douglass Williams & Richard H. Sander, The Prospects for
"Putting America to Work" in the Inner City, 81 GEO. LJ. 2003, 2016 (1993) (observing
that "the ravages of deindustrialization have decimated the number of low-skilled
manufacturing jobs upon which working class blacks have traditionally relied").
25. See Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and America's
Eroding Industrial Base, 81 GEO. L.J. 1757,1760-61 (1993). Some argued that this also led
to the creation of the "underclass." See WILSON, supra note 24, at 7-8 ("[T]he term
underclass suggests that changes have taken place in ghetto neighborhoods, and the
groups that have been left behind are collectively different from those that lived in these
neighborhoods in earlier years.").
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Once the government realized that too many welfare recipients
did not work and might never receive financial support from the
fathers of their children, it attempted to solve the non-work problem
by creating programs to increase welfare recipients' educational 6 and
vocational12 7 skills. These programs, designed primarily to modify
welfare recipients' perceived negative attitude toward wage-earning
work, were criticized because they did not produce quantifiable
indicators that they actually caused welfare mothers to leave home
and work in the market.28 Indeed, some argued that the programs, as
structured, could never be expected to solve the non-work problem.
For example, critics contended that even if increasing a welfare
recipient's educational level arguably increased her long-term job
opportunities, this was of little use to women who were not motivated
to learn. For these women, education became important only after
they were in the job market and realized that having more education
would help them get a promotion or a better job.29 Thus, this type of
program had few (if any) tangible short-term benefits, especially for
women trapped in a culture or cycle of dependency. Vocational
training programs also were viewed as ineffective. Critics argued that
even if these programs eventually caused welfare mothers to readjust
their attitudes toward wage-paying work or gave them the discipline
to find and keep jobs, vocational training alone would not solve the
work problem. Virtually all welfare experts agreed that the one thing
crucial to keeping welfare mothers out of poverty and off the welfare
rolls is a wage-paying job, something neither vocational nor
educational programs could provide.30 Though some critics proposed
that welfare recipients be forced to work, liberal politicians
consistently defeated these proposals, though they supported the
26. See generally DANIEL FRIEDLANDER & GARY BURTLESS, FIVE YEARS AFTER:
THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF WELFARE-TO-WORK PROGRAMS 55 (1995).
27. See generally Robert Preer, Boot Camp's Tough Love Boosts Job Searchers:
Training Program Targets the Chronically Unemployed, THE PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy,
Mass.), Jul. 14, 1998, at 14E (describing a Boston job search training course designed to
provide job training to help overcome the trainees' negative attitudes toward work).
28. See generally William F. Goodling, The Successful Work in Welfare, 9 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 45, 47-48 (1998) (arguing that long-term education programs that have been
proposed generally do not work).
29. See generally Rebecca M. Blank et al., A Primer on Welfare Reform, in LOOKING
BEFORE WE LEAP: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND WELFARE REFORM 54-55 (R. Kent Weaver &
William T. Dickens eds., 1995) [hereinafter Primer]; MARY JO BANE & DAVID T.
ELLWOOD, WELFARE REALITIES: FROM RHETORIC TO REFORM 108 (1994).
30. See, e.g., MARMOR ET AL, supra note 4, at 121 (stressing the importance of putting
welfare recipients in jobs because the "principal determinant of poverty is unemployment,
and of long-term poverty, long-term unemployment. This is true not only in the United
States; it is what our Western European allies have found as well.").
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notion that mothers should be given the opportunity to work.31 They
opposed compelled work on a number of grounds: they believed that
jobs were not available; and that, even where jobs were available,
welfare recipients did not have the requisite educational or
employment skills to get jobs;32 or that available jobs were menial or
demeaning. They also cited factors unrelated to a "work ethic," such
as the inability to collect court-ordered child support,33 inadequate
child care, lack of transportation, and other factors which prevented
single mothers from keeping jobs? 4 Conservatives responded that
work-even if "dirty"-should be obligatory because work was
something welfare recipients owed to recompense society for the
financial support of welfare.35
B. Recent Congressional Attempts to Solve the Welfare Problem
By the time Congress resolved to end welfare as we knew it in
1996, the public had developed an extremely negative attitude toward
entitlements in general, and toward welfare and welfare recipients
31. See LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS
OF CITIZENSHIP 91-126 (1986) (tracing the dispute from 1935 through the early 1980s).
32. See CHARLES NOBLE, WELFARE As WE KNEW IT: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 143 (1997) ("[M]aking welfare mothers take low-wage
jobs is only likely to generalize the problem of working poverty, as people with little
education and burdensome family responsibilities will be forced into the low-wage, low-
skilled jobs that already prevent millions of working Americans from escaping poverty.");
HANDLER, supra note 5, at 33-39 (arguing that "[t]he problems attributed to welfare are,
in reality, the problems of poverty" and positing that the increase in the poverty rate of
full-time workers correlates to the substantial decline in the real earnings of less skilled,
less educated workers).
33. Not receiving child support appears to be a major economic detriment to single
mothers. For example, the total child support collected in 1996 was $12,018,767, of which
less than 24% ($2,854,502) went to AFDC recipients. While 2,563,716 cases involving
non-AFDC mothers successfully collected child support, the average number of AFDC
cases which collected child support in 1996 was 940,452, or approximately 27% of the total
number of cases. See COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 1998 GREEN BOOK, 630-39.
34. See MARMOR ET AL., supra note 4, at 121 (expressing the concern that placing
welfare recipients in jobs "addresses the supply side of the problem but not the demand
side" because the jobs most likely available to these workers do not provide wages
"sufficient to lift them out of poverty."); see also NOBLE, supra note 32, at 143
("[E]nforced work is not likely to improve either the attitudes of the poor (if attitudes are
a problem), or their expectations that something positive will come from that work
without changes in job markets, remedial education, and job training.").
35. See, e.g., MEAD, supra note 31, at 67 ("The moral lessons most people learn, that
they must work and take care of their families if they are to prosper, were blocked for
much of the underclass by federal policy. Society normally exacts work or other
contributions from its members in return for support."); see also Stephen D. Sugarman,
Financial Support of Children and the End of Welfare As We Know It, 81 VA. L. REV.
2523, 2543-52 (1995) (discussing prior welfare-to-work programs and the "any job is a
good job" views expressed by some reformers).
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specifically.36 Indeed, by then even the term "welfare" carried
negative connotations.3 7 Critics maintained that giving non-working,
able-bodied women welfare benefits denigrated the importance of
work in the market 38 and discouraged them from even trying to pull
themselves up by their bootstraps.39 In addition, the public felt that
the welfare system itself had created a perpetually dependent,
morally unworthy underclass.40 Some even suggested that politicians
intentionally created and maintained a voting bloc of welfare
dependents.4'
36. See, e.g., HANDLER, supra note 5, at 148 ("Today's AFDC recipients suffer from
so many negatively ascribed characteristics-African-American, sexual promiscuity,
underclass, criminality, substance abuse, spawning a new generation of criminals--that
one wonders whether attitudes will ever change."); Lee Anne Fennell, Interdependence
and Choice in Distributive Justice: The Welfare Conundrum, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 235, 286-98
(discussing the perceived losses and gains behind the negative public sentiment on
welfare); Nancy Gibbs, The Vicious Cycle (young single mothers on welfare), TIME, June
20, 1994, at 24 (citing reform measures against the backdrop of public opinion and stories
of welfare abusers).
37. Though the word "welfare" generally means well-being or prosperity, and once
connoted a vision of a potentially good life, the term came to be viewed as grudging aid to
the unworthy. See LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND
THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890-1935, at 1 (1994).
38. See Robert Solomon, Ending Welfare Mythology as We Know It, 15 YALE J. ON
REG. 177,189-90 (1998) (book review) (citing findings which support the notion that some
mothers choose welfare over work rationally); JENCKS, supra note 19, at 223-25 (positing
that welfare mothers refuse to work in low-wage jobs if they are left as poor as if they
remained in the home); MEAD, supra note 31, at 81-82 (asserting that "[w]ork is normative
for the poor, but it is not something they feel they must do, whatever the personal cost").
39. Data indicated that some welfare recipients chose to receive welfare benefits
rather than earn wages because prior welfare laws had weak work incentives. See COMM.
ON THE BUDGET, A HELPING HAND, NOT A HANDOUT, H.R. REP. No. 104-651, at 3-4
(1996) (citing a Cato Institute study which found that welfare benefits were more generous
than work and thereby encouraged long-term dependency). See also MEAD, supra note
31, at 81 (citing a study that indicated that non-working welfare mothers properly could be
classified as "traditional" women who prefer to stay home and raise their families and felt
that society should support them in their role as mothers).
40. See MARMOR ET AL, supra note 4, at 115 ("[The emerging image of poverty is
one of permanent deprivation combined with serious social pathology; it is a vision of
what has come to be called 'the underclass."'); Simon supra note 11, at 11 ("[D]ependence
connoted the morally inferior status of living on income not acquired through effort or
exchange."). A study of residents of a large public housing project in Chicago (Cabrini-
Green) indicated that some recipients remained on welfare because of the "dramatic
difference between the rules of the workplace and norms of behavior in the neighborhood
where the recipients resided." Primer, supra note 29, at 40. See also Joel F. Handler,
"Ending Welfare As We Know It"-Wrong For Welfare, Wrong For Poverty, 2 GEO. J. ON
FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 7 (1994) (discussing the "cycle of welfare dependency").
41. The noted newspaper columnist Anthony Lewis once described a letter he
received from a person whose parents came to the United States as refugees "with just $10
in their pockets." Anthony Lewis, Comment, in WORK AND WELFARE 55, 55 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1998). The letter writer expressed his hostility to welfare laws and
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Recent federal reforms assumed that most welfare recipients
were unwilling (not unable) to find or hold jobs and that they harmed
society, themselves and their dependent children by refusing to
work.42 The 1996 welfare reforms can in many ways be viewed as an
attempt to settle the debate over the best way both to force the poor
to understand that they must work43 and to eliminate welfare
opportunism while simultaneously providing a safety net for the
undeniably deserving poor (i.e., children)!4 Because able-bodied
unemployed welfare mothers were not deemed worthy to receive
public financial assistance, recent reforms sought to prevent these
non-deserving women from receiving benefits in the future. The
modem stereotype of the non-deserving welfare mother is the well-
known "welfare queen."
The welfare queen was portrayed as a long-term dependent,
unmarried, urban black woman45 who (1) had a herd of illegitimate
characterized them as a "DIABOLICAL LIBERAL INVENTION to keep a large
population destitute, and to guarantee a voting bloc for politicians who promise the best
handout." Id.
42. See Margo D. Butts, Urban Welfare Reform: A Community-Based Perspective, 22
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 897, 898 (1995) ("Many of these families and individuals do not
perceive gainful employment as a realistic option; instead, they rely exclusively on welfare
on account of low self-esteem and lack of marketable skills."). Critics of former welfare
laws argued that society overall is harmed when users abuse the system because taxpayers
are forced to subsidize the irresponsible behavior of others. See generally MEAD, supra
note 31, at 54-61 (stressing the need for welfare users to accept responsibility for their
problems).
43. Some argued that the poor understood that they should work, but felt that they
should not be forced to take certain jobs. See MEAD, supra note 31, at 76-82 (positing that
poor blacks may refuse to accept "dirty" or menial jobs because of their political view that
white society used those jobs to control them).
44. Notwithstanding the demonization of the primary beneficiaries of welfare
(mothers), reformers felt sympathy toward (and wanted to protect) the secondary
beneficiaries, i.e., the "innocent" children of single mothers who receive AFDC. See R.
Kent Weaver et al, Public Opinion on Welfare Reform: A Mandate For What?, in
LOOKING BEFORE WE LEAP: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND WELFARE REFORM 109, 110-11 (R.
Kent Weaver & William T. Dickens eds., 1995) [hereinafter Public Opinion]. But cf
Fineman, supra note 13, at 292-93 (arguing that if children ("inevitable dependents") are
the deserving poor, then the mothers who are caretakers of inevitable dependents
("derivative dependents") also should be viewed as the deserving poor).
45. See Public Opinion, supra note 44, at 110-11 (noting that the term "welfare"
stimulates an association with racial minorities); GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE'S END 23
(1998) (referring to the "racial mythology" of welfare); Lucie E. White, On the
"Consensus" To End Welfare: Where are the Women's Voices?, 26 CONN. L. REv. 843,854
(1994) (discussing the "counterfactual racist stereotypes of the lazy unmarried welfare
mother with many children and the 'welfare queen'-stereotypes that are statistically and
experientially false"-and noting that "AFDC was becoming identified as 'black"'). See
generally Wahneema Lubiano, Black Ladies, Welfare Queens, and State Minstrels:
Ideological War by Narrative Means, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER:
ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCrION OF SOCIAL
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children,46 (2) felt she had a God-given right to stay home full-time to
rear those children,47 (3) steadfastly refused to work in the labor
market to earn income to support those children,48 but (4) wore
designer clothing while driving her Cadillac to the grocery store to
buy filet mignon with her food stamps.49 Rather than assume that the
welfare queen profile was either an outright myth or an aberrant
exception,50 welfare reform proceeded as if all welfare recipients were
welfare queens and welfare mothers were lazy and chose not to work
to support their families.
Because welfare mothers willingly accepted public economic
support, many felt that welfare laws should be used to force them to
modify their personal behavior.51 For example, critics argue that
REALITY 323, 330, 332 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992).
It is not terribly surprising that modem welfare reform discussions were tinged with
racial overtones since race has always played a role in AFDC discussions. See MELNICK,
supra note 1, at 68-69 (stating that the most vocal opposition to initial federal control of
state AFDC programs "came from two devoted segregationists, Representative Howard
Smith and Senator Harry Byrd (Democrats of Virginia)" because they "clearly did not
want to be told how to treat poor blacks").
46. See HANDLER, supra note 5, at 44-45 ("The popular stereotype or myth is that
welfare is composed primarily of young black women who have lots of children, are long-
term dependent, and pass on this dependency from generation to generation."). But cf.
1998 GREEN BOOK, supra note 33, at 435-437, Table 7-19 (indicating that, in 1995, only
25% of welfare mothers had more than two children); MINK, supra note 45, at 33 (arguing
that 72% of welfare mothers have no more than two children).
47. See Nichola L. Marshall, Note, The Welfare Reform Act of 1996: Political
Compromise or Panacea for Welfare Dependency?, 4 GEo. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 333,
340-41 (1997) (discussing the lives of two single mothers (one wage earner, the other on
welfare) and the welfare mother's view that the other mother was "crazy for going to work
because of the negative impact it has had on her children's lives").
48. One welfare commentator argues that welfare should be used to redistribute
income security toward family caregivers and that welfare should be thought of "as the
income owed to persons who work inside the home caring for, nurturing, and protecting
children." MINK, supra note 45, at 19. See generally Minow, supra note 22, at 830,841-42
(arguing that taking care of children, especially the young, is valuable work and that
welfare mothers should not necessarily be made to work outside of the home).
49. See Steven V. Roberts, Food Stamps Program: How It Grew and How Reagan
Wants to Cut It Back, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1981, at 11 (discussing the "legend of the so-
called 'welfare queen,' a heavy woman driving a big white Cadillac and paying for thick
steaks with wads of food stamps"); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival
Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF
LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 40, 49-50 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Nancy
Sweet Thomadsen eds., 1991) (discussing the public's obsession with welfare fraud and the
"Black, jewel-bedecked, Cadillac-driving welfare queen").
50. See NOBLE, supra note 32, at 142 (suggesting that only a "minority of families who
have received AFDC benefits since the program expanded have depended on it for a long
time").
51. See, e.g., HANDLER, supra note 5, at 89-90 (discussing reforms that sought to
change social behavior and reformers' beliefs that poverty primarily is behavioral, not
economic or environmental); MELNICK, supra note 1, at 118 (noting "Congress's
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imposing moral or "family" values on welfare mothers was the most
effective way to modify their attitude toward work, to make them
engage in socially acceptable behavior and, ultimately, to break their
psychological dependence on welfare.52 Imposing these values, critics
claimed, would prevent welfare mothers from viewing welfare as a
guaranteed, life-long source of income, would discourage them from
having children outside of marriage, 53 would encourage men to marry
(or at least agree to support) the mothers of their children54 and, thus,
would prevent the threatened destruction of the "traditional"55
family.56
Because both Congress and the public seemed convinced that
welfare laws encouraged welfare opportunism, Congress sought to
incorporate behavioral restrictions in the new welfare law.
Specifically, to instill in welfare recipients the importance of earning
their own wages and to curb the expansion of the underclass, the
reforms (1) conditioned welfare benefits on the recipients' willingness
to take jobs-any jobs-in the workforce, and (2) imposed eligibility
inclination to insist upon behavioral prerequisites for welfare"); cf. MEAD, supra note 31,
at 46-47 (arguing that prior welfare reforms were doomed to fail because recipients were
never told what was expected of them in terms of their personal conduct). For general
discussions of earlier attempts to use welfare to modify recipients' behavior, see generally
Simon, supra note 11, at 2-3; William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the
Welfare System, 92 YALE L.. 1198 (1983); Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division:
Behavior Modiftcation Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719, 723 (1992).
52. See Twila L. Perry, Family Values, Race, Feminism and Public Policy, 36 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 345, 351 (1996) ("There also seems to be a growing belief that when
people resort to AFDC it is not a temporary status, but instead leads to generations of
welfare dependency, crime, and low academic achievement."). See, e.g., MELNICK, supra
note 1, at 129 (discussing the Reagan Administration's imposition of family norms on
welfare users).
53. See MELNICK, supra note 1, at 66 (discussing view held by conservatives that the
AFDC program "subsidize[s] immorality by providing benefits to illegitimate children,...
treats unmarried parents better than married ones ... [and] creates a form of dependency
that is... passed from one generation to another").
54. See HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 4, at 7 (stating that one of the "family
values" themes of 1996 welfare reforms was to require states to terminate welfare benefits
if mothers refused to cooperate in establishing paternity and obtaining child support);
MINK, supra note 45, at 69-77 (characterizing 1996 welfare reform as an attempt to force
men to act like responsible providers for the families).
55. Not everyone would agree that a "traditional" family can only be defined as a
husband, wife and, children. See generally Jane Mauldon, Family Change and Welfare
Reform, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 325, 330-33 (1996); Twila L. Perry, Alimony: Race,
Privilege, and Dependency in the Search for Theory, 82 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2486-90 (1994).
56. See NOBLE, supra note 32, at 127 (observing that social conservatives felt that the
availability of AFDC encouraged single women to have children and caused families to
break up). See generally MELNICK, supra note 1, at 117 (discussing the results of
experimental programs that "indicated that income guarantees significantly increased the
rate of family breakup, especially for racial minorities").
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restrictions designed to decrease the number and type of welfare
recipients.
C. Work Mandate
By 1996, both conservatives and liberals agreed that, since many
non-welfare mothers worked outside the home, welfare mothers
should not receive welfare benefits unless they also were willing to
work both to earn their welfare benefits and to eliminate the need to
receive public assistance in the future57 As non-work by the poor
was identified as the problem,58 the 1996 reforms were designed to
solve that problem by imposing rigid work rules and mandating dire
consequences for anyone who failed to follow these rules.5 9 To avoid
the perceived deficiencies of prior work programs,60 Congress made
the lynchpin of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 199661 the requirement that all recipients work
as a condition of receiving benefits. Though liberal politicians had
defeated previous attempts to condition welfare benefits on the
recipients' willingness to leave their homes to earn wages, many
ultimately supported the 1996 reforms (though many out of political
necessity) even though the reforms included mandatory work
requirements.62
D. Eligibility Caps
The 1996 reforms sought to modify the behavior of non-working
but able-bodied mothers by imposing value-based eligibility caps. An
important moral belief that the public held, but welfare recipients
allegedly did not, was the importance of rearing children in a married,
two-adult parent home. An equally important value that the public
57. See generally JENCKS, supra note 19, at 226-32 (noting that legislators agreed single
mothers should be encouraged (if not forced) to work outside the home because the
majority of married mothers now hold wage-paying jobs).
58. Of course, non-work in and of itself is not a problem, as witnessed by the fact that
Congress has never suggested that the beneficiaries of trust funds should be forced to
work.
59. The federal government now provides block grants to states conditioned on the
state governments' willingness to mandate that welfare recipients work in return for
receiving benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(a).
60. See supra notes 27 and 30, and text accompanying note 30.
61. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C. and 8 U.S.C.).
62. See Guy Gugliotta & Ruth Marcus, Election-Year Politics Help Democrats Deal
With Differences on Welfare, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 1996, at A8 (citing election-year
politics and the high profile nature of welfare reform as reasons for Democratic liberal
support for reforms); The End?, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, June 16, 1998, at A10
(suggesting that liberals had to embrace welfare reforms that they "deplored" because of
the change in public opinion concerning welfare).
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seemed to conclude both teenage and adult welfare recipients lacked
was the importance of giving birth only to the number of children one
can afford to support financially though one's own labor in the
market. To "convince" welfare mothers to embrace these values, the
1996 reforms changed the availability and level of financial support
for unmarried mothers and for mothers who had additional children
after they initially began to receive welfare benefits.
Welfare critics argued that welfare laws gave teenage girls an
incentive to be sexually promiscuous and to bear children outside of
marriage and that children should not be encouraged to give birth to
children. 63 In addition, critics contended that unmarried teenage
mothers were not deserving welfare recipients and that society had no
duty to support teen mothers.64 The best way to alleviate the need for
the public to support pregnant teens and to discourage them from
getting pregnant in the first place was to (1) deny welfare benefits to
minors and (2) force teenage mothers to remain home with their
parents or to live with the fathers of their children.65 To remove the
incentive for teenage girls to get pregnant, give birth, then set up
house with their babies, the 1996 reforms required states to deny
benefits to mothers who were under the age of 18 unless they
attended school and either lived with an adult or in an adult-
supervised group home.66
The 1996 reforms also sought to break the economic dependency
of long-term adult welfare recipients and to force fathers to
financially support their children. To end the psychological cycle of
dependency, the 1996 welfare reforms required states to restrict a
recipient's ability to receive benefits to no more than twenty-four
continuous months.67  Similarly, to combat the problem of
63. Most agree that having a newborn is the most important factor that causes teen
mothers to apply for AFDC. See 1998 GREEN BOOK, supra note 33, at 537-41 (citing
results of a 14-year study).
64. For a discussion of early attempts to curtail welfare use by teen mothers, see R.
Kent Weaver, The Politics of Welfare Reform, in LOOKING BEFORE WE LEAP: SOCIAL
SCIENCE AND WELFARE REFORM 91, 94-95 (R. Kent Weaver & William T. Dickens eds.,
1995) [hereinafter Politics].
65. See HANDLER, supra note 5, at 107 (discussing reform efforts in Massachusetts);
cf. MINK, supra note 45, at 33 (citing data that only 1.2% of welfare recipients were under
18). Some argued that this approach threatens the well-being of the teens and their babies
because it is at least as likely that denying welfare benefits to young mothers will simply
force them to move (or remain) in an abusive arrangement with parents or partners who
batter the teen or her child(ren). See Primer, supra note 29, at 47-48.
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(4)-(a)(5) (1999).
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(A)(ii). For example, Virginia law imposes a time limit
for users to receive AFDC benefits such that families receive 24 months of benefits and
are then ineligible for benefits for the next 24 months, except upon a showing of
"hardship." VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-133.50 to .51 (Michie 1999).
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intergenerational poverty, Congress prevented welfare recipients
from receiving more than sixty cumulative months of benefits
throughout their lives.68 Critics also felt that treating welfare benefits
as an entitlement gave women an incentive to increase their benefits
by giving birth to more children, yet gave the men who impregnated
them no incentive to either marry the women or financially support
their children. To combat this, the 1996 reforms allowed 69 states to
impose a "family cap" that denied benefits to women who bore
additional children after they first entered the welfare system. 70
Finally, the 1996 reforms gave states the authority to reduce or
eliminate the benefits of any mother who fails to cooperate with the
state's efforts to establish the paternity of her minor child.71
E. Why Lawmakers Compromised on Welfare Reform
Some statements made during the welfare reform debate were
undoubtedly raw political posturing.72 Most welfare reformers (both
conservative and liberal), however, genuinely appeared to support the
reform process because of their belief that existing welfare laws
caused welfare mothers to become economically dependent.7 3
Though liberals overwhelmingly rejected the myth of the welfare
queen while some conservatives seemed to think that all welfare
recipients were welfare queens, reformers ultimately agreed to the
twenty-four month continuous and sixty-month lifetime limitations.
They reached this compromise in large part because they had reliable
68. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(A). See generally HANDLER, supra note 5, at 114 (discussing
time-limited welfare programs).
69. Federal law allowed, but did not mandate, family caps. See General Accounting
office, Restructuring State Welfare Programs, GAOIBEHS-98-109 (June 18, 1998) at 71.
[hereinafter GAO Report].
70. See HANDLER, supra note 5, at 105 (referring to family cap programs as attempts
to influence poor mother's procreation decisions); see also Susan Frelich Appleton, When
Welfare Reforms Promote Abortion: "Personal Responsibility," "Family Values," and the
Right to Choose, 85 GEO L.J. 155, 181-82 (1996), where the author questions whether
welfare reforms-especially family caps-promote abortion. Cf MINK, supra note 45, at
33 (arguing that 61% of welfare recipients do not have additional children while on
welfare).
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(2).
72. Professor Martha Fineman argues that "more than mere money or concern with
poverty is at issue in this debate.... It seems the real concern for many politicians is the
imposition of their own morality, which entails the prevention of unmarried women
having children and the curtailment of divorce." Fineman, supra note 13, at 310. See also
Appleton, supra note 70 (arguing that the actual purpose of welfare reform was to give
public officials an opportunity to express and advance societal views against illegitimacy
and teen pregnancy).
73. See MELNICK, supra note 1, at 260 (observing that legislators "acted not on the
basis of their desire to be reelected or to maintain their power in Congress but on the basis
of strongly held beliefs about the public interest").
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empirical data demonstrating that most welfare recipients left the
welfare rolls within two years, and that those who returned often did
so because of educational and vocational limitations74  Indeed, to
soften the potentially harsh effect of the work requirements and term
limitations, and in recognition of the problems welfare mothers faced
that were not related to their alleged lack of a work ethic, the 1996
reforms supported states' efforts to provide day care assistance and
educational programs for welfare mothers 75
F. Did Recent Reforms Solve the Welfare Problem?
In one major aspect, recent reform efforts can be hailed a
success. Overall, the number of welfare recipients has declined
considerably.76 Teen pregnancy rates also have dropped since the
effective date of the 1996 welfare reforms.77 Given these quantifiable
74. Reformers could agree on the 24-month continuous limit and 60-month lifetime
limit in large part because empirical data indicated that the vast majority of mothers
stayed in the system less than four years. See HANDLER, supra note 5, at 48. Data also
suggested that more than 50% of the welfare recipients at any point in time had received
benefits for more than eight years because they either could (or would) not work. See
BANE & ELLWOOD, supra note 29, at 28-36. Thus, it appeared that while the typical
welfare recipient received benefits short-term and left welfare rolls to get a job, the
majority of welfare recipients in the welfare system at any point in time were long-term
recipients.
See generally Greg J. Duncan & Gretchen Caspary, Welfare Dynamics and The 1996
Welfare Reform, 11 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 605, 619-623 (1997)
(arguing that there are at least two different types of welfare recipients: short-term cyclical
welfare users and long-term, less educated, less vocationally qualified ones. Those with
higher educational levels and prior work experience tended not to return to the system or,
if they did return, stayed only for short periods.). See also Primer, supra note 29, at 36-39;
HANDLER, supra note 5, at 50; CONG. REC. E2157 (daily ed.) (Nov. 10, 1995) (statement
of Rep. Jacobs) (quoting Professor Fran Quigley, Confronting the Myths: The Truth About
Poverty and Welfare, NURO NEWSPAPER, Nov. 2-9, 1995, who asserts that "once the
programs and the people enrolled in them are examined beyond rhetoric about 'lazy
deadbeats' and 'welfare queens,' that actual data show that many of the assumptions of
the welfare debate are incorrect").
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 618 (day care assistance) and §604 (educational assistance)(Supp.
1997).
76. See, e.g., Most States Meet Welfare Law Demands; Work Requirements of 1996 Act
Praised, CI-. TRIB., Dec. 30, 1998, at 12 ("Nationwide the number of people on welfare
has dropped by nearly one-third.... "); James Bennet, 900,000 More Leave the Welfare
Rolls, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1998, at A26; Paul Glastris, Elise Ackerman, Dorian
Friedman, and Warren Cohen, Was Reagan Right? Welfare Rolls Are Shrinking in Part
Because Reform Has 'Smoked Out' a Lot of Cheaters, Though Few Are 'Queens', U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 20, 1997, at 30 (asserting that welfare reform is cleaning
out system abusers who received cash assistance despite having sufficient income from
sources not reported to the government).
77. See Carolyn Starks, District 50 Board Rejects Anti-Pregnancy Program, CI. TRIB.,
May 20, 1998, at 1 (citing that nationally, the teenage birth rate has dropped in recent
years); Ellen Nakashima, Fewer Teens Receiving Abortions in Virginia: Notification Law to
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indicators of "success," one certainly could argue that a woman's
decision to get pregnant, bear the child, and keep it, is affected by the
availability of welfare benefits. Moreover, the drop supports the view
that ending welfare as we knew it removed the financial incentive for
women to bear children outside of marriage and to bear additional
children while receiving public assistance.
If success is measured by the number of mothers who left the
welfare rolls since 1996, and if having too many people on the welfare
rolls was "the problem," then the 1996 reforms solved the problem.
Unfortunately, it is unclear why fewer mothers are receiving
welfare.78 It is possible that reforms succeeded in pushing mothers off
welfare rolls into wage-paying jobs or sent them into (or back to) the
arms of a man who could financially support them and their
children.7 9 It also is possible that the mothers no longer receive
welfare benefits because they failed to comply with their state's
eligibility or work requirements and, thus, were kicked off the welfare
rolls before they found a job (or could snare a wage-earning man).
Recent research indicates that, while some mothers found wage-
paying jobs, a large percentage of the women were who pushed off
the TANF rolls are not employed.80 While it is undisputed that, after
the 1996 reforms, welfare rolls shrunk, no one really knows what
caused the decline or whether the welfare rolls will expand again
when the U.S. economy suffers a setback.
Even if the 1996 reforms succeeded in pushing more welfare
mothers into wage-paying jobs, this does not mean that the reforms
succeeded in solving the "welfare problem." Specifically, if success is
measured by the number of mothers who left the ranks of the
Get Court Test, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1998, at Al (citing that teen birth rates are down
nationally).
78. See GAO Report, supra note 69, at 96 (admitting there is a lack of consensus about
the extent to which economic growth and state welfare reforms caused the decline in
welfare caseloads); Tracking Welfare Reform, THE PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 17, 1998, at 8B
(noting that gauging the success of the reforms is difficult given the complexity of the
welfare problem); Bill Archer, Welfare Reform's Unprecedented Success, WASH. POST,
Aug. 10, 1998, at Op-Ed A17 (citing changes in values and expectations as well as finding
work as reasons for the decline in the welfare rolls); Welfare Rolls are Smallest in 25 years,
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 21, 1998, at N6 ("Officials say the decline in welfare rolls results in part
from federal waivers allowing states to experiment with new welfare policies and from the
1996 law, which established stringent work requirements.").
79. See Good News on Welfare Reform, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1998, at B8 (stating that
one of the reasons for the decline in the rolls in Orange County, California is the good
economy and therefore the availability of more jobs).
80. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor:
Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 552, 607 (1999) (citing
research that indicates that a large percentage of welfare recipients who have left the
TANF rolls are not employed).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51
working poor (rather than the welfare rolls), then it is less clear that
the 1996 reform efforts can be hailed as a success. Though welfare
rates have decreased, poverty rates have not dropped as dramatically
as welfare rates.81 This suggests that many ex-welfare recipients
moved off welfare rolls, but did not move out of poverty.82 Since the
percentage of people who left the welfare rolls is four times the
percentage of people who moved out of poverty, it is reasonable to
assume that some former welfare recipients are working in jobs that
do not pay them enough to support their families or move them from
the ranks of the working poor.83
Given the limited job and educational skills some welfare
mothers possess, the standard of living for these currently employed
former welfare recipients may be worse now than it was when they
received welfare benefits.94 Moreover, given the inadequate child
support collection mechanisms that exist in most states,8
5 it is
81. Census data indicates that, while the number of people receiving welfare assistance
dropped by more than 20% from 1995-97, the number of female-headed families still
living in poverty dropped by less than 5%.
82. See Robert M. Solow, Guess Who Likes Workfare, in WORK AND WELFARE 22
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1998) ("If the end of 'welfare as we know it' means simply the end of
welfare, simply throwing even the least capable onto the labor market to live off their
earnings, the result is likely to be a higher incidence of abject poverty.").
83. In addition, welfare reforms may have inadvertently caused the problem of worker
displacement or poverty substitution. Given the limited job skills of many welfare
mothers, some low-wage workers may have been terminated or replaced when employers
hired the former welfare recipients. If this occurred, then welfare reform would have
succeeded in moving one welfare mother off the welfare rolls, but forcing a now-
unemployed-worker into (or deeper into) poverty. See Solow, supra note 82, at 26 ("Some
former welfare recipients will find jobs, perhaps many will ... but only by displacing
formerly employed members of the assiduously working poor.").
84. See Anuradha Mittal, Is There an End to Hunger? Coming to Terms with Food
Deprivation, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1998, at 5B (noting that the decline of welfare rolls has
caused an increase in the poor at soup kitchens and shelters); Alissa J. Rubin, Poor Kids
Loose Health Care: Ineptitude, Fear Cut Medicaid Rolls, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 19, 1997,
at 45; Lesley Clark, New Welfare Reforms Hurt Children, Critics Say, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Feb. 27,1997, at D3.
85. See generally Jane C. Murray, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions
From Welfare 'Reform', Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688, 723-32
(1998) (outlining child support laws and their effect on mothers and their children and
suggesting it is harder for low income mothers to get support than other mothers); Mink,
supra note 22, at 896 (arguing against relying on enforcement of child support in the
welfare context because "[m]ost obviously for many of the poorest mothers, the fathers of
their children are poor"); Hon. Mark S. Coven, Welfare Reform, Contempt, and Child
Support Enforcement, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1067, 1067-70 (1997) (arguing that lack of
child support drives single parent families into poverty); Greg Gordon, GAO: Child
Support Shouldn't Supplant Welfare, The Agency Said That While States-Minnesota
Among Them-Have Good Collection Records, That Money Would Be a Risky Safety Net,
STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, MN), Aug. 4, 1998, at 6A (discussing 1998 GAO report that
cautions against relying on child support payments to provide safety net for mothers who
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reasonable to assume that some currently employed mothers remain
poor because the income they receive from their low-wage jobs
simply is not sufficient to support their entire family.86 Finally, it is
likely that some mothers remain unemployed, and thus ineligible for
welfare benefits, because they lack reliable day care, live in areas with
limited employment opportunities, lack transportation to get to work,
or choose to be unemployed so they can return to welfare and receive
health coverage for their children.87
Forcing welfare recipients to work meets the short-term goal of
breaking the cycle of poverty and moving women off the welfare rolls.
Unfortunately, it is unclear whether it can achieve the long-term goal
of eliminating the need for welfare or of moving the women and their
children out of poverty. Because welfare was never designed to
redistribute income between the classes, one could argue that the
1996 reforms intended simply to break welfare mother's dependence
on the welfare system. If this is the goal, then the reforms should be
deemed an unqualified success as long as welfare mothers who are
forced off the welfare rolls do not live in abject poverty. If, however,
the 1996 reforms were intended to accomplish more than break the
are forced off welfare rolls); 104 CONG. REC. H3721 (Mar. 23, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Fazio) Profile of Welfare Recipients In Our Country (observing that only 25 percent of
poor women receive child support whereas 43 percent of unmarried women above the
poverty level receive child support payments).
86. A Nobel prize-winning economist recently observed that the "evidence implies
inescapably that the jobs obtainable by former welfare recipients will pay very low wages
and pay them irregularly." See Solow, supra note 82, at 41.
87. One welfare scholar suggests that female heads of households in poverty do not
lack a work ethic and, in fact, consistently have worked. See HANDLER, supra note 4, at
51-55. What they lack, Professor Handler argues, is the ability to find and keep a job that
pays better than welfare. See id. at 54. See also 104 Cong. Rec. H9904 (Aug. 2, 1996)
(statement of Rep. Millender-McDonald) (rejecting theory that most welfare recipients
"are able-bodied persons who do not want to work. Research has provided evidence that
there is much movement between welfare and work .... ).
See also Mink, supra note 45, at 116 (questioning how single, working mothers can
survive in the market when they are required to leave work to care for sick children);
Elspeth K. Deily, Working With Welfare: Can Single Mothers Manage?, 12 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 132, 135-37 (1997) (arguing that finding work is not hard but keeping it is
difficult due to the job market and finding available affordable child care); Greg A. Lohr,
Keeping a Job, Not Finding One, A Problem, DAILY PRESS (Newport News, VA), Jun. 4,
1998, at Al (same); Rena A. Koontz, Welfare Ex-Clients, Deplore Reform Law Say
Training is Sparse, Transit hard to Get, PITrSBURGH POST-GAZETtE, May 23, 1998, at
A12 (citing poor transportation, unavailable childcare, and poor training as problems);
Stacy Hawkins Adams, Back on Welfare-Temporarily, RICHMOND-TIMES DISPATCH,
May 17,1998, at A14 (reporting that one mother had to go back on welfare after childcare
assistance ended); Sheba R. Wheeler, Longtime Recipient Drags Feet on Finding Work,
THE DENVER POST, Jan. 13, 1997, at A8 (recounting stories of mothers who cannot make
ends meet, one of whom had to quit working and get back on welfare to get medicaid
coverage for a daughter bitten by a dog).
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cycle of dependency, and, instead, were intended to help mothers
become economically independent so they could support their
families based solely on the income they earned in the market, then
the reforms ultimately may be deemed an unqualified failure.
Indeed, given the societal factors that impede the employment
opportunities of some poor women and that keep some working
mothers poor, our society may need to prepare for the reality that
some able-bodied people may always need long-term ongoing public
assistance. Accepting this reality, however, would conflict with our
long-standing belief that our market-based society works efficiently
and allows every able-bodied citizen who is willing to work to become
economically self-sufficient. As the ambiguous success of recent
welfare reforms demonstrates, we cannot expect to solve the "welfare
problem" until we correctly define the problem and unless we are
willing to concede that poverty may in fact be the primary cause for
the problem.
H. The Bankruptcy Crisisss
A. Historical View of Debt Relief
The view that people have a moral duty to keep their word, make
good on their promises, and pay their bills is one that is embedded in
the American culture.89  To encourage debt repayment, early
bankruptcy laws were designed to punish and deter financial
irresponsibility.90 These law essentially treated debtors as criminals
and gave creditors the right to have debtors adjudged as
88. This Article discusses only individual debtors' perceived abuse of bankruptcy laws.
While recent legislative efforts and recommendations made in the Report by the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission (the "Commission") also addressed perceived abuse by
business debtors, business bankruptcy filings are not alleged to have contributed to the
current "crisis." See NATIONAL BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT 20
YEARS (1997) [hereinafter REPORT]. For an empirically-based analysis of the crisis, see
Elizabeth Warren, The Bankruptcy Crisis, 73 IND. L.J. 1079 (1998).
89. See Edith H. Jones and Todd J. Zywicki, It's Time for Means-Testing, 1999 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 177,215 ("Promise-keeping and an instinct for fairness and reciprocity are deeply
embedded in our natures and underlie our social structure."); Philip Shuchman, An
Attempt at a "Philosophy of Bankruptcy", 21 UCLA L. Rev. 403, 452-53 (1973)
(characterizing the "view of obligation of debt as a social phenomenon, the common
assumption being that in this society debtors should pay their debts to creditors. It is
considered by many to be a part of our whole social fabric."); Charles G. Hallinan, The
"Fresh Start" Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an Interpretative
Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 49, 140 (1986) ("[T]he moral obligation to keep one's
promises is a virtually universal ethical precept.").
90. See G. Stanley Joslin, The Philosophy of Bankruptcy-A Re-Examination, 17 FLA.
L. REV. 189, 192 (1964) ("In the past, the law of bankruptcy has been intended to punish
and deter, much as criminal law was fashioned.")
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"offenders." 91  Indeed, until the mid-nineteenth century, creditors
could have debtors imprisoned for failing to pay their bills.92
Bankruptcy, thus, was initially viewed as a distributive process
designed solely to benefit creditors.93
Bankruptcy later ultimately developed a somewhat more
humanitarian approach that expressed a concern for rehabilitating
financially distressed consumers, who originally were small business
owners.94 This change in attitude developed as a result of the
practical reality that keeping entrepreneurs hopelessly insolvent
created expensive social costs, not because the government felt
debtors were entitled to forgiveness for their prior debts.95 Thus, the
focus of bankruptcy laws largely remained on assisting creditors
throughout the nineteenth century. 6
Both business owners and wage earners have had the ability to
discharge their debts with relative ease throughout this century.97
Since most people felt a moral duty to pay their bills,98 people
typically would file for bankruptcy only if they were in dire financial
need.99 Thus, because of the stigma previously attached to being
labeled a bankrupt or debtor,1°° Americans historically were reluctant
91. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States,
3 ABI L. REV. 5,7-8 (1995).
92. See id. at 12. For a discussion of the general change in approach to a debtor's right
to discharge legal obligations in bankruptcy, see Charles Tabb, Historical Evolution of the
Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR. L. J. 325 (1991).
93. See Joslin, supra note 90, at 191.
94. See id. (noting attitude change that "included a concern for the debtor and his
rehabilitation").
95. See id.
96. See Tabb, supra note 91, at 14-23.
97. For an overview of the history of American bankruptcy laws, see CHARLES TABB,
THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 32-36 (1997).
98. See Shuchman, supra note 89, at 455-56 ("many, probably most, persons in our
society view debt payment as a matter of duty. They pay their debts (and judge others
accordingly) not so much because they think that it is just to do so or because it will bring
about the most good for themselves or for all, but because it is proper and right to pay
one's debts." (footnote omitted)).
99. See Resolved. The Time Has Come for Means Testing Consumer Bankruptcy-A
Debate, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 6 (1998) (hereinafter ABI DEBATE)(Comment of George
Wallace):
a second practical limit upon the use of bankruptcy [has] been a sense of personal
responsibility amongst Americans that they will not use bankruptcy and shed
their contractual, their moral obligations, to repay people that have loaned them
money, unless they are in dire need. We call this bankruptcy stigma sometimes,
but it is essentially a feeling of personal responsibility that has controlled the
abuse of bankruptcy. The statute is vulnerable to abuse, but a sense of personal
responsibility amongst Americans has controlled its use.
100. Before Congress adopted the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, a person who filed for
bankruptcy was referred to as a "bankrupt." Now, the person is called a "debtor."
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to file for bankruptcy and, in some instances, would repay debts even
if those debts had been discharged in bankruptcy.10 1 Though certain
groups or types of people may have elected to avoid the stigma of
being labeled a bankrupt or debtor, bankruptcy relief has not been
restricted to any socio-economic class nor has it been based on the
debtor's ability to work to repay her debts. That is, unlike welfare
laws, bankruptcy eligibility is not "means" tested, needs-based, or
otherwise indexed to a debtor's current, or reasonably anticipated
future, needs or income. Because of this, a rich person who chooses
not to repay her current debts from current income is eligible to be a
debtor in bankruptcy even though technically she may not be
insolvent.
Whatever stigma previously was associated with filing for
bankruptcy appears to have decreased (or disappeared) in recent
years.10 2 Currently, if an individual is eligible for relief under Chapter
7, she cannot be forced to repay her debts through a Chapter 13 plan
even if she has the means to repay some of her debts out of future
income.1 03 As a result, debtors increasingly have sought to discharge
their debts in a Chapter 7 liquidation case though they theoretically
have the means to pay at least some of those debts over time through
a Chapter 13 wage earner's plan.1°4 Indeed, it is because of the
relatively recent filings of the rich and famous, and filings by debtors
who amassed massive credit card debts, that critics now question the
validity of the goals and purposes of debt-relief for the able-bodied. 05
101. See F.H. Buckley and Margaret F. Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 187,194(1998) (noting that Sir Walter Scott and Mark Twain worked to repay debts
even though they had been legally discharged). See also Jones and Zywicki, supra note 89,
at 215 (bemoaning the decline of bankruptcy shame and stigma); Peter Pae and Stephanie
Stoughton, Personal Bankruptcy Filings Hit Record, Easy Credit Blamed, Congress May
Act, WASH. POST, Jun. 7, 1998, at Al (noting concern expressed by Rep. Bill McCollum
(R-Fla), a major supporter of current reforms, that the "stigma" of filing for bankruptcy is
gone).
102. See sources cited in supra note 101. One wonders when the stigma allegedly
associated with bankruptcy last existed, as an academic commentator observed over 30
years ago that "while one may become somewhat stigmatized as a result of bearing the
label of a bankrupt, this stigma is becoming of diminishing social importance." Joslin,
supra note 90, at 192.
103. As long as a debtor has not engaged in certain acts of misconduct and has not
dismissed any case within the past 180 days, she is entitled to a Chapter 7 discharge. See
11 U.S.C. § 109(b) and § 727(a)(1994). If the court finds that allowing the case to proceed
would be a substantial abuse of the bankruptcy laws, however, it may dismiss the case
under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1994).
104. For an exhaustive discussion of the factors courts should consider when
determining what it means to have the "ability to pay" debts, see In re Attanasio, 218 B.R.
180 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998).
105. See In re Brown, 211 B.R. 183, 184 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 1997) (bankruptcy filing of
recording artist Rachelle Ferrell); Lax Bankruptcy Laws Make Everyone Pay, USA
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B. Justification for Bankruptcy Relief
Throughout this century, bankruptcy laws have had two primary
goals. The first goal is to maintain a uniform and orderly debt
repayment system.1°6 This goal primarily helps creditors as a group
because it prevents individual creditors from pursuing their self-
interest in collecting their debts by racing to the courthouse to seize a
financially ailing debtor's assets.107 Though some bankruptcy scholars
have questioned the wisdom of creating a federal bankruptcy scheme
that is inconsistent with or disrupts state law collection repayment
schemes, 108 bankruptcy commentators generally agree that having a
systematic distribution of a debtor's assets is preferable to having the
assets dissipated in an ad hoe disorderly fashion.1°9
The second goal is to provide economic relief to overburdened
debtors. The Supreme Court repeatedly has stated that the fresh start
is designed to excuse the honest but unfortunate debtor from repaying
debts.110 It is unclear whether a person who could repay her debts but
chooses not to do so can genuinely be called honest or -
notwithstanding the fresh start doctrine - whether allowing people to
avoid the responsibility of repaying debts they appear able to pay is
TODAY, JIM. 12, 1997, at 14A (noting bankruptcy filings of former baseball commissioner
Bowie Kuhn, former Arizona Governor Fife Symmington, and wall street financier Paul
Bilzerian); Tonya Pendleton, The Price of Fame Can Be Bankruptcy, THE RECORD (New
Jersey), Apr. 11, 1998, at Y1 (reporting the bankruptcy filings of recording artists MC
Hammer, TLC, and Toni Braxton). See also In re Rembert, 141 F. 3d 277 (6th Cir. 1998)
(debtor filed for bankruptcy after using credit card to get cash advances for gambling
purposes); In re MD Uddin, 196 B.R. 19 (S.D. N.Y. 1996) (debtor misrepresented income
to get credit cards, charged $60,000 in perfume, electronics and other luxury items, then
filed for bankruptcy); John O'Brien, Court Clerk Lived High Before Fall, POST-
STANDARD (Syracuse, NY), Oct. 20, 1997, at Al (reporting on local court clerk who
amassed $47,000 credit card bill in travel expenses, then filed for bankruptcy).
106. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 366-68 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6321-24 (discussing debt repayment goal).
107. See, e.g., BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 563 (1994); Vanston
Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161 (1946); Stellwagen v.
Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918); Williams v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 549,
554 (1915).
108. See e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
21-22 (1986) (positing that bankruptcy collectivization does not justify reordering state law
entitlements).
109. See id at 21 (agreeing that bankruptcy laws "may be an occasion to collectivize
what hitherto had been an individual remedies system").
110. The fresh start policy gives "the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for
distribution the property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in
life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of
pre-existing debt." Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). Other cases
referring to the "honest but unfortunate debtor" include Cohen v. De La Cruz, 523 U.S.
213,217 (1998), Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279,287 (1991), and Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S.
127,128 (1979).
ever a worthwhile goal. Likewise, bankruptcy laws have never
specified exactly how destitute a debtor must be before her economic
plight is deemed unfortunate enough to give her the right to seek a
fresh start.
Not surprisingly, bankruptcy courts and commentators sharply
disagree over the extent to which bankruptcy laws should be used to
protect an able-bodied person's right to discharge debts and embark
on a "fresh start" in life free of the obligation to repay debts."' The
original purpose of the discharge was, like bankruptcy laws overall,
designed to benefit creditors. That is, under early bankruptcy laws,
only creditors could initiate a bankruptcy case: voluntary debtor-filed
cases were not permitted." 2 To reward debtors for disclosing assets
to the trustee and for willingly participating in this creditor-initiated
collection process, bankruptcy laws gave debtors a fresh financial
start.113 Because bankruptcy cases can now be filed by debtors, the
fresh start is now designed to benefit only the debtor.
In justifying the fresh start, some argue that financially strapped
debtors who have a present inability to repay their debts should be
allowed to discharge them because the discharge will help restore
their self-esteem and will increase the likelihood that they will be
contributing, goods-purchasing members of society in the future." 4
Others argue that debtors should be allowed to discharge debts they
111. Providing an in-depth definition of, or justification for, the fresh start (especially in
the light of the recent explosion in bankruptcy filings) is beyond the scope of this article.
Other commentators previously have addressed various aspects of the justification, scope
and contours of the fresh start. See Lawrence Ponoroff and F. Stephen Knippenberg,
Debtors Who Convert Their Assets on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims of the
Fresh Start?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 235 (1995); Lawrence Ponoroff and F. Stephen
Knippenberg, The Implied Good Faith Filing Requirement; Sentinel of an Evolving
Bankruptcy Policy, 85 NW. U.L. REV. 919 (1991); Charles J. Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh
Start in Bankruptcy: Collateral Conversions and the Dischargeability Debate, 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 56 (1990); Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer
Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L. J. 1047 (1987); Hallihan, supra note 89; Jackson, supra note
108.
112. The Bankruptcy Act of 1841 was the first American law that abandoned the idea
that bankruptcy laws existed for the benefit of the creditors alone and allowed debtors to
voluntarily to bring their estates into the bankruptcy courts for equitable distribution. See
H. REMINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 8 at
17 (1950).
113. See Steven L. Harris, A Reply to Theodore Eisenberg's Bankruptcy Law in
Perspective, 30 UCLA L. REv. 327,350-51 (1982); Hallinan, supra note 111, at 54; Adam J.
Hirsch, Inheritance and Bankruptcy: The Meaning of the "Fresh Start," 45 HASTINGS LJ.
175,202 n.87 (1994).
114. See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE LJ.
763, 785-86 (1983) (arguing that the fresh start is needed to restore the debtor's confidence
in his capacity to govern his economic life in the future); Hallinan, supra note 89, at 57
(referring to the "socioeconomic policy and social utility" purposes of the fresh start).
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presently cannot repay because forgiveness is good philosophically
and morally and that our society should give the financially burdened
a second chance."15 Finally, debtors arguably should be allowed to
discharge debts they lack the present means to pay to ensure that the
fresh start will remove the "stigma" of being destitute and is
consistent with modem bankruptcy laws' less punitive nature.116
It is impossible to simultaneously maximize debt repayment and
maximize an honest and unfortunate debtor's ability to discharge the
very debts that creditors seek to have repaid. 1 7  As a result,
bankruptcy courts often find themselves asked to resolve
unresolvable conflicts created by these competing goals." 8 Because
bankruptcy laws are not need-based or means-tested, the tension
between debt repayment and the fresh start policy is especially
pronounced when deciding whether a person who lacks the present
means to repay his bills should be allowed to discharge his debts if he
could work to repay some of the debts from future earnings. Due in
large part to the urging of a well-funded credit card lobby,"19 Congress
115. See KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS 97 (1997), where Professor
Karen Gross refers to the fresh start as the "legal analogue to divine intervention" because
it gives debtors the emotional recovery they need to start over in life, and Hallinan, supra
note 89, at 57 (noting that the fresh start noted that "mercy or forbearance [w]as the
morally correct response to financial failure and depicted collection efforts as a morally
repugnant effort to inflict suffering for greedy motives"). Cf. MARMOR ET AL., supra note
4, at 24 (observing that, under the "behaviorist vision" of social welfare policy, people who
believe that society has a duty to support the poor - even if they are poor by choice -
concede that this may do more harm than good and may perpetuate the economic plight
of the poor and reinforce their dependency on the welfare system).
116. Cf Shuchman, supra note 89, at 459 (listing that bankruptcy was designed to be a
"means of redistributing wealth and a psychological liberation, a possibly stigmatizing
experience"). Of course, one might respond that modem bankruptcy abuse occurs
precisely because there no longer is a stigma attached to filing for bankruptcy. See Jacob
M. Schlesinger, Card Games: As Bankruptcies Surge, Creditors Lobby Hard to Get Harder
Laws - But Whether Many People Shirk Bills They Can Pay Remains Open to Debate -
Changing the Lender's Image, WALL ST. J., Jun. 17, 1998, at Al (reporting that creditor
groups contend that the "bankruptcy boom" is driven by "a decline in the social stigma of
bankruptcy").
117. Indeed, the goals are unrelated and could be accomplished independently of each
other. That is, bankruptcy laws could allow debtors to discharge their debts without
requiring that the discharge take place in a collective debt proceeding. Likewise,
bankruptcy laws could force creditors to participate in a collective debt proceeding while
denying the debtor the right to discharge any debts or keep any assets.
118. See Donald R. Korobkin, Value and Rationality in Bankruptcy Decisionmaking, 33
WM. & MARY L. REV. 333, 336 (1992) ("A decisionmaker in bankruptcy must apparently
be capable of unattainable wisdom - of resolving seemingly intractable conflicts between
and among fundamentally incommensurable values."); Hallihan, supra note 89, at 143-46
(observing the conflict between competing two primary bankruptcy goals and suggesting
that "the availability of a means for release from payment is in some respects at odds with
[the collection of debts] policy").
119. See Schlesinger, supra note 116 (reporting that credit industry spent more than $2
[Vol. 51
recently became convinced that too many undeserving able-bodied
people were filing for bankruptcy. To prevent those potentially
unworthy debtors from discharging debts allegedly within their means
to pay, Congress sought to end bankruptcy as we know it.
C. Recent Attempts to Solve the Bankruptcy Problem
(1) Characterizing the Problem
Recent bankruptcy reform discussions were contentious because
pro-debtor and pro-creditor advocates disagreed over several
fundamental issues, including what type of person deserves the right
to file for bankruptcy, why so many people are filing for bankruptcy,
and whether debt repayment should be mandatory.120 By far, the
most controversial topic was whether debtors should be forced to
repay their debts if they appear to have the future means to do so.
Indeed, critics argued that the bankruptcy problem was created
because people are allowed to discharge debts that are within their
ability to pay.12'
Academic commentators have long suggested that providing a
risk-free, guaranteed safety net encourages what generally can be
called bankruptcy opportunism. Bankruptcy opportunism occurs
when a potential debtor systematically and strategically engages in
reckless spending because of his knowledge that bankruptcy law will
subsidize the costs of his irresponsible conduct. 22 The bankruptcy
safety net thus underestimates the real costs of the debtor's
irresponsible spending by forcing creditors and society as a whole to
million in lobbying in 1997). See also Common Cause, Going for Broke: Big Money, Big
Banks & Bankruptcy (1998) (reporting that consumer credit industry gave $61.6 million,
an average of $100,000 in political action committee contributions to each member of the
Senate, since 1987) (on file with author).
120. In discussing the process the Commission used to develop proposed changes to the
consumer bankruptcy system, Professor Elizabeth Warren (the reporter for the
Commission) observed that debtors and creditors who testified before the Commission
wanted a system that helps those who need help (debtors' recommendation) but does give
help those who do not need it (creditors' message). See Elizabeth Warren, A Principled
Approach to Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 483, 492-93 (1997). Thus, the
battleground was not whether needy debtors should be allowed to use the system but,
rather, how "needy" should be defined. See id. at 493. See also Consumer Bankruptcy
Reform Roundtable, 7 A.B.I. L. REv. 3, 4 (1999) (comments of Judge Eugene Wedoff)
(stating that "I don't think that anyone can deny" that making debtors who have a
"genuine ability to repay their debts" is a "legitimate aim").
121. See generally Jones and Zywicki, supra note 89.
122. See Jackson, supra note 15, at 1402. See also Buckley and Brinig, supra note 101,
at 189-91 (noting that 1984 bankruptcy reforms were designed to curb debtor
opportunism).
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subsidize or at least bear a portion of those costs.123 The concept of
bankruptcy opportunism is not merely an academic concern. Courts,
Congress, and to some extent the public also are disturbed by the
notion that a person can choose not to repay bills that are within her
ability to pay. To minimize the moral hazard created by a bankruptcy
system that does not require debtors to repay debts within their
means, over the last decade courts and Congress searched for ways to
interpret or modify the Code in ways that would discourage debtors
from making risky, ill-advised credit decisions.
(2) Judicial Characterization
The Code does not give bankruptcy courts the authority to order
able-bodied, employed debtors to work (or get another or a better
paying job) to repay their bills in Chapter 13 rather than discharge
them in Chapter 7. Despite this, courts increasingly consider a
debtor's work status when reviewing the debtor's bankruptcy petition
or plan. Courts most often consider a debtor's employment
opportunities when the debtor files for relief under Chapter 7 rather
than Chapter 13, seeks to discharge debts that presumptively are non-
dischargeable, or proposes a Chapter 13 plan that repays only a small
percentage of debts.124 While courts understand that they cannot
order a debtor to get a job (or a better-paying job), they increasingly
have been willing to dismiss Chapter 7 petitions'25 and to refuse to
discharge presumptively non-dischargeable debts126 or confirm
123. See Jackson, supra note 15, at 1402. Cf Jackson, supra note 15, at 1422 n.95
(explaining why allowing a debtor to switch to a lower wage job to avoid repaying a debt
creates a negative externality because the decision to earn less (but consume more leisure)
costs the debtor nothing but imposes a social cost on creditors).
124. For example, debtors may discharge student loan debt only by showing that it
would be an undue hardship to force them to repay the debt. See 11 U.S.C. § 523
(a)(8)(B)(1994). Similarly, Chapter 7 debtors may discharge certain non-support divorce
debts only if they can show either that they do not have the ability to repay the debt or
that the harm of forcing them to repay the debt is greater than the benefit the ex-spouse
will receive by if the debt is repaid. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)(1994).
125. See, e.g., In re Kamen, 231 B.R. 275, 279 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (considering
unemployment of debtor-spouse as factor in deciding to dismiss debtors' Chapter 7
petition).
126. See In re Lehman, 226 B.R. 805, 809 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998) (finding that able-bodied
debtor with an advanced degree from Oxford who earned a living by selling pottery must
repay his student loans); In re Jenkins, 202 B.R. 102, 106 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1996) (noting
that an unemployed party who was trained as a surgical technical had voluntarily reduced
her income through underemployment); In re Smither, 194 B.R. 102, 111 (Bankr. W.D.
Ky. 1996) (finding that when either the debtor or creditor has voluntarily reduced their
income, court can consider the reduction when determining whether to discharge a
divorce debt); In re Slover, 191 B.R. 886, 892 (Bankr. E.D. Okl. 1996) (considering
debtor's capacity to earn $1,200 monthly as an automobile financier); Klause v. Thompson(In re Klause), 181 B.R. 487, 495 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995) (finding that a debtor who was
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Chapter 13 plans that repay a small percentage of debts' 27 when they
conclude that a debtor has made a conscious decision to be un- or
under-employed.
Allowing a debtor to discharge debts would help protect a
debtor's fresh start. Yet, in deciding whether to allow a debtor to
proceed in Chapter 7 or to discharge presumptively non-
dischargeable debts, or in evaluating whether a debtor has committed
all disposable income to making plan payments,12 courts now
routinely consider whether the debtor appears to have made a choice
not to maximize her earnings potential. Likewise, courts routinely
conclude that allowing a debtor to choose not to maximize his earning
potential would not be fair to creditors and would frustrate the goal
of maximizing debt repayment.
(3) Legislative Characterization
Comments made during recent legislative debates echo the
concerns expressed in court opinions involving voluntarily un- or
under-employed debtors. Congress sought to reform bankruptcy laws
because the public in general, and certain specific creditors, felt the
typical debtor - like the typical welfare recipient - was fiscally
irresponsible, refused to work (or otherwise sacrifice) to repay his
bills, then relied on federal law to resolve his financial crisis. 129 There
trained in real estate management was voluntarily underemployed and that
underemployment permits the court to impute income based on the party's earning
ability); In re Erickson, 52 B.R. 154, 158 (Bankr. D. N.D.1985) (finding student loans
nondischargeable, though the debtor's current employment and income levels would not
permit repayment because her income prospects in view of her educational level are
bright).
127. See, e.g., In re Petersen, 228 B.R. 19 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998) (refusing to confirm
plan of attorney who had the potential to substantially increase his earnings and who had
an annual salary that exceeded $500,000 three years prior to filing).
128. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B)(1994) (requiring the debtor to apply all projected
disposable income to making plan payments).
129. See Improved Bankruptcy Law a Worthy Goal for Congress, OMAHA WORLD-
HERALD, Jun. 14,1998, at 32A (stating that the government can help the bankruptcy filing
problem by stamping "out the notion that the bankruptcy laws are just another way of
working the system"); Jamie Clary, Bill Would Make it Harder to Wipe Away Bankruptcy
Debt, NASH. BUS. J., Apr. 17, 1998, at 9 (quoting statement by general counsel of the
Tennessee Bankers Association that "Bankruptcy is no longer a last resort. It has become
a first resort."); Going for Broke, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 10, 1998, (Editorial) at A10
(stating that present abuse of the system "requires tightening the mechanism for awarding
bankruptcy protection"); Bankruptcies, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 9, 1998,
(Editorial) at A12 (stating that reform is necessary to curb the practice of using
bankruptcy as "something less than" a last resort); End Abuses of Bankruptcy Option with
Regulations, Common Sense, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, FL), Dec. 18, 1997,
(Editorial) at 30A (stating that many debtors "treat bankruptcy as a first choice option not
a last resort").
WORKING POORNovember 1999]
is support for this view: even a quick perusal of reported court
decisions reveals that some debtors use bankruptcy laws to subsidize
lavish lifestyles,130 punish former spouses131 or avoid paying debts that
clearly are within their means to repay.132 Given the presence of
these non-deserving debtors and the public's response to them,
Congress created a "bankruptcy queen" profile. That is, to many
legislators the typical debtor is the owner of a multi-million dollar
exempt 133 mansion,13 charges lavish trinkets on a Visa card (or takes
130. See, e.g., In re Kamen, 231 B.R. 275, 278-79 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1999) (dismissing
case because, despite unemployment of debtor-wife, the debtors substantially increased
their credit card balances and took out a loan from their retirement plan to pay for their
daughter's extravagant wedding); In re Petersen, 228 B.R. 19, 26 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998)
(characterizing debtor who recently owned mudslide-damaged California mansion,
firebombed Lamborghini, and Rolls Royce as having "little integrity and even less
sincerity in seeking bankruptcy protection"); Kornfield v. Schwartz (In re Kornfield), 214
B.R. 705, 711 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1997) (noting debtors' monthly food expenses of $1,200,
clothing expenses of $400, and housing expenses of $3,000 for family of six); In re Stewart,
201 B.R. 996, 1007 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1996) (stating that debtor claimed monthly food
expenses of $500 for himself); In re Mastromarino, 197 B.R. 171,180 (Bankr. D. Me. 1996)(objecting to debtor's proposed monthly contribution to a family trust); In re Gavita, 177
B.R. 43, 46 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1994) (noting that debtor subscribed to cable and premium
movie channel and claimed monthly movie rental expense of $100).
131. See In re Lewis, 227 B.R. 886, 889 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1998) (finding debtor's "sole
motive in filing" was to circumvent state court alimony and child support orders); In re
Maras, 226 B.R. 696,702 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1998) (finding debtor's "sole motivation" for
filing for bankruptcy was to avoid paying his former wife); In re Traub, 14 0 B.R. 286, 291(Bankr. D. N.M. 1992) (finding that debtor filed to avoid paying property settlement to ex-
spouse); In re Palmer, 117 B.R. 443,448 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1990) (noting that debtor filed
to avoid a single debt owed to ex-spouse); In re Shands, 63 B.R. 121, 124 (Bankr. E. D.
Mich. 1985) (finding that debtor filed to "spite" ex-spouse).
132. See Kornfield, 214 B.R. at 710-71 (dismissing the debtors' Chapter 7 petition after
concluding that they could curtail their extravagant lifestyle and repay their consumer
debts from future earnings); Scheinberg v. United States Trustee, 134 B.R. 426, 429
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1992) (rejecting debtors' unsubstantiated expenses and finding they could
use their monthly disposable income of $2,000 to fund a Chapter 11 plan); In re Rushing,
93 B.R. 750, 752 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1988) (finding that debtors who owned luxury boat for
recreational purposes could afford to repay debts).
133. Debtors from states with liberal exemption statutes frequently are used to
illustrate the "bankruptcy queen" profile. Texas debtors are often branded as non-
deserving manipulators of the bankruptcy laws because they are entitled to "exempt" (i.e.,
keep from creditors) a homestead of unlimited value. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§41.001(a) (West Supp. 1997). See also Border v. McDaniel (In re McDaniel II), 70 F. 3d
841, 843 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[W]e must uphold and enforce the Texas homestead laws even
though in so doing we might unwittingly-or even knowingly but powerless to avoid it-
'assist a dishonest debtor in wrongfully defeating his creditor.' This may account for the
oft-repeated creditor's lament: 'Debtors either die or move to Texas."') (footnote
omitted). See also In re Bruski, 226 B.R. 422, 423 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 1998), where the
debtors relied on state law to exempt money held in an annuity even though the court
conceded that annuities generally are used as "an investment vehicle which Congress
designed to afford tax relief for the rich." The court compared the debtors to Mark
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a cash advance from the credit card to fund a gambling trip to Reno),
then cavalierly files for bankruptcy rather than selling the exempt
assets, curtailing spending habits, or working to repay the credit card
debt.135
No one disputes that there has been a dramatic increase in the
number of consumer bankruptcy filings over the past twenty years.
136
As was true during welfare reform efforts, however, critics relied on
the presence of what may in fact be a small number of able-bodied,
employed, but irresponsible debtors to "prove" that bankruptcy is too
easy, that most debtors have the ability to repay their bills (and, thus,
do not deserve bankruptcy relief), that the availability of bankruptcy
relief encourages deviant, socially undesirable behavior, and,
consequently that bankruptcy laws harm society overall.137
Just as the welfare queen profile unfairly mischaracterized
Twain's PRINCE AND THE PAUPER, because they "suddenly found themselves able to
partake of one of the retirement luxuries of the wealth." Id The court then noted that
the debtors' ability to exempt the property "highlights the tension which often results
between [bankruptcy's] two divergent goals." Id.
134. It is possible-probably likely-that current bankruptcy laws permit some debtors
to discharge most of their debts yet keep expensive homes. For example, the debtors in
Bank Leumi Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Milton Lang, 898 F. Supp. 883 (S.D. Fla. 1995), moved
from New Jersey to Florida then purchased (and were allowed to keep) a home and
annuities with a combined value of one million dollars. Likewise, the debtors in In re
Joseph & Elaine Primack, 89 B.R. 954 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988), exempted a $450,000 house
even though they purchased it 16 months before they filed for bankruptcy and they moved
from Colorado, which had a limited homestead exemption.
135. See Bill DiPaolo, Arising From the Debt, NEWS SENTINEL (Ft. Wayne, Indiana),
March 3, 1997, (Business Monday) at 1B (citing studies that indicate "many people who
declare bankruptcy actually have money to pay a portion of the bills."); ABI DEBATE,
supra note 99, at 6 (indicating that one of the debaters (George Wallace, representing the
American Financial Services Association) stated that many who file for Chapter 7 actually
have the ability to pay 30-40% of their unsecured debts, and therefore should be required
to do so). See also Hon. Dorothy Eisenberg, Consumer Debtors: Combining Chapters 7
and 13, 4 AM. BANKR. INsT. L.J. 511 (1996) (arguing that Chapters 7 and 13 should be
combined to encourage debtors to repay some of their debt from future earnings).
136. There were 282,570 non-business filings in 1980,718,107 in 1990, and
1,398,182 in 1998. See ABI World (visited May 26,1999)
http:/lwww.abiworld.orglstatslnewstatsfront.html. See also Pae and Stoughton, supra note
101 (reporting that filings increased 20% from 1996 to 1997 and that 1 in every 70
households filed for bankruptcy). Given the American business ingenuity, it is not
surprising that some people are not upset by (and, indeed, have profited from) this
increase. See Bridig McMenamin, Uncle Sam Is My Collection Agent, FORBES, June 15,
1988, at 44 (discussing unit of investment bank Bear Stearns that purchases debts owed by
Chapter 13 debtors in bulk then relies on Chapter 13 trustees to collect their claims).
137. See In re Mathenia, 220 B.R. 427, 433 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998) (referring to
debtors in the case as "the poster children for the standard creditors' argument, to which
this court does not subscribe, that bankruptcy is too easy, is constantly taken advantage of
by unscrupulous debtors, and operates against the interest of society in general, not to
mention creditors in particular").
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welfare recipients, characterizing all debtors as irresponsible
spendthrifts is misleading and unwarranted. Though some debtors
may properly be characterized as liars, cheats, and frauds, media
reports and court decisions indicate that many people file for
bankruptcy because they are financially naive and have little
experience using credit, 138 or have encountered economic crises
beyond their control, like incurring uninsured medical expenses, 139
being forced to pay divorce-related expenses,140 or finding themselves
unexpectedly unemployed.' 4' In addition, the most recent
comprehensive empirical research on consumer filings refutes the
contention that the typical debtor is an irresponsible spendthrift who
has the ability to repay the debts sought to be discharged. 42
138. See Gene Tharps, Students: Beware the credit card trap, ATL. J. & CONSTITUTION,
Sep. 27, 1998, at R8 (citing consumer group report that only 20% of students knew how
long it would take to pay off credit card debt if they make only the monthly minimum
payment); Sarah Rose, Prepping for college credit, MONEY MAG., Sep. 1998, at 156-57
(discussing credit card companies' aggressive marketing efforts toward college students
and noting two states' efforts to bar card marketers from colleges); Kia Shant'e Breaux,
Stakes are High for Student Gamblers, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1998, at A9 (noting that
college students are flooded with credit card offers); Charles A. Jaffe, A Noteworthy
Lesson Charge Cards 101: This College Course Carries No Credit, CHI. TRIBUNE, Sep. 15,
1997, at C1 (same).
139. See Pae and Stoughton, supra note 101 at Al (discussing debtor who filed because
of medical expenses for which she was personally liable because she was never employed
long enough to become eligible for health insurance). See also In re Attanasio, 218 B.R.
180, 230 n.75 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998) ("Medical problems represent the most common
form of calamity that causes economic problems and persistently impairs a debtor's ability
to pay debts.").
140. See In re Waters, 227 B.R. 784, 785 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1998) (noting that debtor
filed for relief under Chapter 7 after becoming unemployed and separating from her
husband); Pae and Stoughton, supra note 101 (reporting that bankruptcy attorneys and
economists attribute the increase in consumer filings to sudden downturns in debtors'
lives, like divorce and illness); Going Broke: Bankruptcy Stigma Lessens, USA TODAY,
Jun. 10, 1997, at 1A (citing poll results that suggest that job loss, divorce, and medical
expenses frequently push debtors into filings for bankruptcy). Cf. Jagdeep S. Bhandar and
Lawrence A. Weiss, The Increasing Bankruptcy Filing Rate: An Historical Analysis, 67
AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 8-9 (1993) (discussing study that found that, while divorce was not
significantly related to bankruptcy filings, divorce affects an individual's capacity to service
debt and debt servicing is significantly related to bankruptcy filings).
141. See, e.g., In re Beles, 135 B.R. 286, 287 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (debtors incurred
extensive credit card debt primarily for living expenses after the husband had a heart
attack and lost his job); Pae and Stoughton, supra note 101, at Al (discussing married
couple who filed for bankruptcy after their income was reduced by one-third when the
wife unexpectedly was laid off). Unemployment, accidents, and illness seem to have been
the leading causes for consumer filings for at least 20 years. See Shuchman, supra note 89,
at 454 (citing same three factors as the typical reasons for consumer filings under the
Bankruptcy Act).
142. The most comprehensive empirical study of consumer bankruptcy filings examined
1600 debtors in three states. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR
DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA (1989) [hereinafter As
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Despite critics' efforts to present a monolithic debtor profile,
debtors tend to fall into three broad categories. The first group
consists of able-bodied and financially responsible people who cannot
make ends meet after they encounter an economic crisis like a
financially devastating divorce, involuntary unemployment or
recurring, uninsured medical expenses. The "problem" with Group I
debtors does not appear to be irresponsible spending. Instead, their
inability to support themselves seems to be caused by societal factors
unrelated to their spending habits. Debtors in the second group are
able-bodied (but financially unsophisticated) people who, when
presented with "easy" credit, choose to use that credit irresponsibly
after they encounter an unexpected financial setback.43  The
"problem" with Group II debtors is irresponsible spending, but they
decided to spend irresponsibly only after they encountered the same
types of non-credit based economic crises that affect Group I
debtors.144 Group III debtors consist of able-bodied people who
intentionally overextend themselves on credit then seek to use
bankruptcy laws to support or subsidize their extravagant lifestyle.
The "problem" with Group III debtors is just plain, inexcusable,
unforgiveable, irresponsible spending.
The problems of Group I debtors are best remedied by
protecting their fresh start and allowing them to quickly discharge
WE FORGIVE]. Though this study is rarely attacked on its methodology, the data these
scholars examined is approximately ten years old and, thus, cannot be relied on to explain
the recent explosion in consumer bankruptcy filings. Ironically, before they completed
that study, the authors noted that "empirical research had played almost no role in the
development of bankruptcy policy." Teresa A. Sullivan, et. al, The Use of Empirical Data
in Formulating Bankruptcy Policy, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 195 (1987).
Unfortunately, we now find ourselves back in the same position we faced in 1987 with
massive reforms proposed, yet no empirical research to support those reforms.
143. See Pae and Stoughton, supra note 101, at Al (relating woes of automobile
repairman with $55,000 household income who used credit cards to pay household
expenses after two children were born and his wife crashed the family car); id. at __
(medical technician reporting that he filed for bankruptcy to discharge credit card debt
incurred to buy groceries and clothes).
144. I am not suggesting that debtors in Group II are forced to overspend, or forced to
incur debt involuntarily. I merely suggest that many people who do not live frivolous
lives, but want to achieve the 1950s version of the American Dream, may find it
increasingly difficult to do so given the changes in the wage labor market. Indeed, the
credit industry appears to have encouraged consumers to overextend themselves for the
last several decades. See Joslin, supra note 90, at 194 ("It does not seem that the average
small consumer-debtor alone is to be condemned for his overpurchasing, but much of the
blame may be placed on easy credit, discount paper, and high-pressure and commission-
type selling in which the seller may impose his will upon the gullible wage earner."). But
see Jones and Zywicki, supra note 89, at 222-26 (criticizing the view that "debt causes
bankruptcy" and positing that "[c]onsumers do not collect debt, they collect the things
they buy with debt").
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their debts.145 In contrast, the problems of Group III debtors can best
be remedied by maximizing debt repayment and forcing them to work
to repay their bills. 146 Deciding what to do about Group II debtors is
more complicated. Policymakers have not developed a theoretical
framework to address, or have created an effective solution to, the
problems that affect Group II, i.e., basically honest people who
arguably are non-deserving because they contributed to their inability
to pay their bills. Indeed, most consumer bankruptcy theories
developed during the 1970s and 1980s are based on two debtor
profiles, Group I debtors who encounter unavoidable financial crises
and Group III debtors who "imprudently calculate their income and
outlays."' 47  Existing bankruptcy theories largely fail to address
debtors who prudently calculate their income, realize they cannot
make ends meet on that income, then rationally choose to
overspend.148 Unfortunately, recent reforms have proposed that a
one-size-fits-all approach be used to solve the bankruptcy problem.
D. Recent Congressional Attempts to Solve the Bankruptcy Problem
Just as critics reached the conclusion that welfare laws needed to
be reformed to eliminate welfare opportunism, media reports suggest
that the public has concluded that Congress needs to reform
bankruptcy laws to prevent bankruptcy opportunism. Critics argued
that current bankruptcy laws subsidize debtors' decisions to maintain
lavish, unaffordable lifestyles and that the laws encouraged debtors to
engage in morally and legally unconscionable behavior.149 Thus,
critics argued that bankruptcy laws must force debtors to use credit
cards responsibly and make debtors with disposable current or
145. Bankruptcy critics and supporters alike consistently have agreed that the fresh
start applies to this type of debtor and that this type of debtor is the prototypical honest
and unfortunate debtor. See Hallinan, supra note 89, at 66 ("[T]here appears to have been
little dispute about the propriety of bankruptcy for consumers whose inability to pay their
debts could be attributed to external economic events or personal misfortune.").
146. During a debate on means testing, an opponent of means testing observed that
both sides could agree that people at the very high end ought not to be able to discharge
their debts without payments. See ABI DEBATE, supra note 99, at 44 (Rebuttal of Gary
Klein).
147. Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 953, 979
(1981); Hallihan, supra note 89, at 66,155.
148. See Ted Appel, Consumer Debts Climbing Bankruptcies Rise, Businesses Fare
Better, PREss DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, CA), Mar. 31, 1999, at El (quoting bankruptcy
attorney who stated that his clients use credit cards "to try to bridge a gap between their
living expenses and their income").
149. Cf. Jones and Zywicki, supra note 89, at 181 ("A promise to repay money is an
important legal and moral obligation, neither lightly to be undertaken nor lightly cast
away.").
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anticipated future income repay their debts. 50 To accomplish this,
Congress supported legislation that (1) forces debtors with "means"
to repay their bills' 51 and (2) imposes eligibility caps to bar certain
debtors from bankruptcy altogether.
(1) Mandated Work Via Means-Testing 52
In general, means-testing requires debtors with disposable
income or non-exempt assets to either sell those assets or to use
future income to repay present debts.153 If bankruptcy becomes a
means-tested system, debtors will be prevented from discharging
debts in Chapter 7 if they are deemed to have the current or future
means to repay a certain percentage of those debts in a Chapter 13
plan.154 Making bankruptcy a means-tested system would radically
150. See Make Bankruptcy Filing Tougher, THE PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy, MA), May
6, 1998, (Editorial) at 14 (arguing that lenient bankruptcy laws harm people who live
within their means); Jane Seaberry, Personal bankruptcies draw little sympathy from
Texans, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 23, 1998, at ID (noting Texans' objection to
current bankruptcy laws because they discourage personal responsibility); Bankruptcy
Theory: No Matter What Economists Say, the Consumer Debt Bomb is Ticking,
Ticking..., BARRON'S, Feb. 3, 1997, at 17 (reporting that economists blame the increase
in consumer bankruptcies on "lenient judges and antiquated laws that make it easy for
people to escape their financial responsibility").
151. See H.R. 3150,105th Cong. (1998). H.R. 833, a virtually identical bill to H.R. 3150,
was introduced in the 106th Congress as "The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999." Though
means-tested bankruptcy legislation failed to pass during the 105th Congress, the failure
was due more to Congressional interest in the sex lives of William Jefferson Clinton and
Monica Lewinsky during the fall of 1998 than to lack of interest in requiring means-
testing. See, e.g., Consumer Roundtable, supra note 120, at 7 (1999) (comments of John
McMickle, legal counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on
Administrative Oversight) (stating that there were enough votes in the House and Senate
to pass means-tested legislation during 105th Congress).
152. This article will not enter the debate over the virtues or vices of means-testing.
Others already have tackled this divisive and controversial topic. For views opposing
means-testing, see Warren, supra note 88; Jean Braucher, Increasing Uniformity in
Consumer Bankruptcy: Means Testing as a Distraction and the National Bankruptcy
Review Commission's Proposals as a Starting Point, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. (1998);
Gary Klein, Means Tested Bankruptcy: What Would It Mean, 28 U. MEM. L. REv. 711
(1998). For a particularly vitriolic critique of the views expressed by the opponents of
means-testing, see Jones and Zywicki, supra note 89, at 178 (characterizing views as
"overwrought responses" and expressing concern that "well-known academics and
bankruptcy specialists have chosen to oppose means-testing viscerally"); id. at 207
(characterizing views as "Apocalyptic rhetoric").
153. See H.R 3150. See generally Warren, supra note 120, at 503-06 (discussing
consumer credit industry's proposal to the Commission to add a "means test" to limit
debtors' access to Chapter 7).
154. See H.R. 3150 § 101. Both House Bill 3150 and House Bill 833 contain formulae
that govern when a court must deny bankruptcy eligibility to a potential Chapter 7 debtor.
In general, the bills require the court to prevent a debtor from discharging debts in
Chapter 7 if the debtors' income exceeds a certain state or national average and if, after
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change modem bankruptcy policy and procedure. 155 In fact, some
have objected to prior proposals to means-test or otherwise make
Chapter 13 debt repayment plans mandatory based on their view that
forcing debtors to repay their debts violates the constitutional ban on
involuntary servitude.' 56 Other have criticized forced debt repayment
proposals because (1) the majority of existing (i.e., voluntary)
Chapter 13 plans already are unsuccessful, 157 (2) debtors are unlikely
to repay debts over a protracted period of time unless they are
personally committed to doing so, 58 and (3) unexpected economic
crises unrelated to a debtor's work or financial ethics often prevent
debtors from making all payments required by the Chapter 13 plan. 59
deducting expenses (also determined by a state/national figure), the debtor could repay a
certain percentage of his debts over a three to five year time period. See H.R. 3150 § 409;
H.R. 833 § 102. Given the high failure rate of three year, voluntary Chapter 13 plans, it is
curious that current reforms seek to force more debtors into Chapter 13, to force them to
make higher monthly payments, and in limited circumstances, to mandate that their plan
last five years.
155. See Harris, supra note 113, at 346-47 (discussing proposals in the 1960s and 1970s
to make Chapter 13 mandatory for some debtors and noting that the prior Bankruptcy
Commission and the House Judiciary Committee rejected these proposals).
156. See, e.g., Karen Gross, The Debtor as Modern Day Peon: A Problem of
Unconstitutional Conditions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 165, 167 (1990); Harris, supra note
113, at 348-49 (presenting the views of various scholars that suggest that mandatory
Chapter 13 cases would be unconstitutional); Eisenberg, supra note 147, at 987 (suggesting
that some scholars reject mandatory Chapter 13 cases because "society has progressed
away from peonage, other forms of involuntary servitude, and imprisonment for debt" and
that mandatory Chapter 13 plans "are a step backwards"). But see Kenneth N. Klee,
Restructuring Individual Debts, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431, 447-49 (1997) (detailing proposal
requiring debtors to repay debts and rejecting argument that such a requirement violates
the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude); Eisenberg, supra
note 147, at 988 (rejecting view of involuntary Chapter 13 cases as involuntary servitude
and arguing that "despite the presence of the word 'involuntary' in its label, [such a plan]
bears none of the offensive attributes of involuntary servitude or peonage. Such a plan
does not require the debtor to work under threat of imprisonment. Unlike involuntary
servitude, it involves no physical compulsion to work.") (footnote omitted).
157. See Braucher, supra note 152, at 11 (citing Commission's finding that the failure
rate for Chapter 13 plans "exceeds 60 percent"); In re Attanasio, 218 B.R. 180, 195
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998) (discussing the "high failure rate of Chapter 13 cases").
158. See Gary Klein, Consumer Bankruptcy in the Balance: The National Bankruptcy
Review Commission's Recommendations Tilt Toward Creditors, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 293, 322 (1997). The author states that due to the "substantial commitment"
required by a Chapter 13 plan, the debtor must enter the plan voluntarily or it will have
"little chance of success." This is similar to views expressed by opponents of compelled
workfare for welfare recipients. But see Eisenberg, supra note 147, at 989 (rejecting
notion that debtors will not be motivated to fund a plan because of unlikelihood that
debtors would refuse to work "just to frustrate a Chapter 13 plan"). Cf MEAD, supra note
31, at 109 (discussing statements that forcing welfare recipients to take dead-end jobs will
not solve poverty problem and will instead inevitably lead to high job turnover).
159. See Klein, supra note 158, at 335 & 339 n.263. Klein, a leading consumer rights
advocate, acknowledges the great difficulty that Chapter 13 debtors have in meeting
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Means-testing does not explicitly require debtors to work to
repay their debts. It does, however, prevent debtors from receiving a
quick, unimpeded Chapter 7 discharge if a formula determines that
they have the current or anticipated future means to repay some of
their debts. Though a major business entity,160 prominent bankruptcy
scholars, 161 professional organizations, 162 and judges 63 objected to
earlier means-testing reforms, few argue that means-testing is per se
objectionable. Indeed, as long as the income ceiling is low enough to
protect the truly deserving Group I debtor, yet high enough to screen
out Group III debtors, means-testing should help eliminate much of
the existing abuse of bankruptcy law.164 Means-testing does not
surprise financial responsibilities because all funds not required for maintenance and
support of the debtor's household must be used to make plan payments (which the
Chapter 13 trustee will then use to repay debts). He argues that allowing Chapter 13
debtors to put ten percent of their plan payments into a contingency fund "greatly
enhance the success of Chapter 13 cases because debtors would have savings available in
the event of new short-term financial problems." ItL at 335 n.263. The author suggests
that the fund be paid to creditors if no problems arise. See also Attanasio, 218 B.R. at 195
(noting that debtors fail to complete Chapter 13 plan payments because "[1]ife is full of
surprises. Unanticipated expenses are the rule rather than the exception.").
160. Congress created the U.S. Small Business Administration to serve as an
independent voice for small businesses and to represent the views of small businesses
before Congress and federal regulatory agencies. In a letter dated April 22, 1998, the
Chief Counsel for Advocacy expressed the concern that the Bankruptcy Act of 1998
"would make fundamental, expansive and potentially detrimental changes to
entrepreneurship." See Letter from Office of Chief Counsel for Advocacy (April 22,
1998) (on file with author).
161. See Letter to Congress signed by 60 law professors (March 31, 1998) (arguing that
reform debate was "ill-considered, rushed and unbalanced") (available at
http://www.law.indiana.edu/-bmarkell/slowdown.html (visited June 2, 1999)). In the spirit
of full disclosure, I acknowledge that I was one of the professors who signed this letter.
162. See Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 3150, National Bankruptcy Conference
(on file with author) (describing proposal to add needs-based bankruptcy as "ill-advised"
and "without credible evidence that such substantial change is cost-justified"); Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1998: Hearings on H.R. 3150 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and
Admin. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of
American College of Bankruptcy) (warning that legislating "complicated tests of eligibility
for bankruptcy without further careful review of the causes may unduly burden the system
by requiring more judges and higher costs" and urging "that serious consideration be
given to slowing down the legislative process and for a more deliberative approach to
evolving a modest solution").
163. See Letter to Congress signed by 110 United States Bankruptcy Judges (April 9,
1998) (expressing their concern over proposed reforms) (available at
<http://www.abiworld.org/legislbills/judgesapr98.html> (visited June 2, 1999)).
164. Even with a sufficiently low income ceiling, however, deserving debtors may be
harmed in the future if Congress continues to increase the number of categories of debts
that are non-dischargeable. For example, if Congress capitulates to the credit card
industry's desire to prevent debtors from discharging all credit card debt that is incurred in
a short window (60-90 days) preceding a bankruptcy filing, then it is likely that some
Group II (and perhaps some Group I) debtors will be prevented from discharging
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mandate work (as welfare reforms did). Nonetheless, preventing
debtors from discharging their debts in Chapter 7 if they are deemed
to have the means to repay them uses the potential of future earnings
to restrict a debtor's ability to discharge debts, thus, effectively
forcing the debtor into an involuntary Chapter 13 debt repayment
case. In short, means or needs-based testing effectively tells debtors
that, in return for accepting bankruptcy relief, they must: get a job (or
a second job, or a higher paying job), keep that job, and, use the
earnings they receive over a five year period to repay their debts.
(2) Eligibility Caps
Just as welfare reform was designed to modify the values of
welfare recipients, recent bankruptcy efforts and, before then, judicial
interpretations of bankruptcy law, sought to modify the values of
able-bodied debtors. During legislative reform discussions, many
suggested that some debtors file for bankruptcy too often and too
cavalierly. 165 To force moral values on debtors and make them act
responsibly, Congress considered ways to restrict debtors' access to
bankruptcy relief.
Currently, there is only one type of restriction that could be
construed as a "term-limit." This restriction, contained in Section
727(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code, prevents a debtor from receiving a
Chapter 7 discharge more frequently than once every six years.
Current bankruptcy law does not restrict the number of times a
debtor can file for relief under Chapter 13 case, or the number of
times a debtor can file for bankruptcy in his lifetime. Since Chapter
13 cases are designed to be used to repay the debtor's bills, it is
understandable that the Code would not prohibit multiple debt
repayment plans. In response to allegations that too many people
filed serial Chapter 13 cases but failed to complete plan payments in
any of those cases, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission
considered whether to recommend that Congress restrict the number
of times a debtor can file a Chapter 13 petition.
The Commission originally recommended imposing a two-year
bar on refilings, without regard to whether the debtor made all, some,
or no plan payments in the prior case.166 Because, however, the
purchases of non-frivolous items even though the debts were not fraudulently incurred.
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(1993) (making fraudulently incurred debts non-dischargeable);
11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(C)(Supp. 1999) (making purchases of luxury goods or services
presumptively non-dischargeable if incurred 60 days pre-petition).
165. But cf. Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Searching for
Reorganization Realities, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1257, 1283 (1994) (citing a study that found
"very few debtors filed more than once").
166. See REPORT, supra note 88, at 279 n.736.
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Commission was unable to conclusively state that there is a
prevalence of serial filings in Chapter 13 cases, it ultimately refused to
recommend a filing bar. Instead, it recommended that a debtor who
filed two petitions within a six-year time frame then files a third
petition within six months of the dismissal or conversion of the second
petition, be deprived of the protections of the automatic stay when he
filed the third petition.167
Congress also considered several types of bankruptcy term or
eligibility restrictions during the 105th and 106th Congressional
sessions. The same bills that proposed means-testing also proposed
that debtors be deemed ineligible for bankruptcy relief unless they
completed credit counseling before they filed for bankruptcy. 168 One
bill effectively prevented all debtors (whether Group I, II, or I)
from filing for bankruptcy unless they received counseling within
ninety days before they filed for bankruptcy even though many
people who are about to file for bankruptcy cannot afford to pay for
credit counseling and may lose their homes or have their wages
garnished unless they are given immediate bankruptcy protection.169
Congress also considered increasing the time period that governs
Chapter 7 cases and imposing a time period for Chapter 13 cases.
The legislation proposed that, for Chapter 7 cases, the time period be
extended from six to eight years.170 The proposed time limit
restriction for Chapter 13 cases would be, in many aspects, even more
burdensome since one bill proposed that a Chapter 13 debtor (1)
receive a discharge only after he makes all payments (over a three to
five year period) and (2) be barred from filing another Chapter 13
petition for five additional years - even if he repaid all his debts in full
167. See id at 1.5.5. See also id. at 10 & App. G-1.a (recommending that the
automatic stay terminate fifteen days after the filing by a debtor of a third party
bankruptcy petition within a five-year period unless no party in interest objects).
168. See H.R. 3150,105th Cong. § 104 (1998). A Senate bill was substantially similar as
it also required debtors to participate in pre-petition debt counseling and made
participation a prerequisite to receiving a discharge. See S. 1301, 105th Cong.
§321(a)(1998). This bill provided that the United States Office of the Trustee could waive
this requirement by certifying that "suitable" courses were not available. Unfortunately,
Congress gave no guidelines or criteria that explained when a debt-counseling program
should be deemed to be "suitable."
A conference bill submitted during the 105th Congress proposed to make debtors
ineligible to file unless they received credit counseling during the 90 days preceding filing
unless they showed that "exigent circumstances" exist or they requested credit counseling
but could not obtain it during that five day period. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-794
§302(a)(1998).
169. In addition, potential debtors may use funds they had earmarked for paying an
attorney to pay for pre-petition credit-counseling. If these individuals ultimately become
pro se debtors, this would impose an additional administrative cost on the bankruptcy
clerk's office, trustees, and (ultimately) bankruptcy judges.
170. See, e.g., H.R. 3150 § 171.
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during the initial case.171
Neither the Commission's Report nor legislative reforms
proposed the type of family caps adopted by the 1996 welfare
reforms. The court in In re Nelson,172 however, imposed the
functional equivalent of a family cap in a Chapter 13 case. In that
case, the debtor asked the court to allow her to reduce the amount of
her Chapter 13 plan payments due to increased monthly expenses
associated with her new, physically disabled, spouse. While the court
conceded that the new spouse was too disabled to work outside the
home, it nonetheless refused to allow the debtor to adjust her
monthly plan payments to account for his living expenses. The court
refused to allow the debtor to decrease her plan payments and, thus,
pay her creditors less based on its conclusion that it is inappropriate
and unfair to creditors to allow a debtor to decrease plan payments
because of a choice to marry a disabled person.173
The court ruled that the debtor's choice was "voluntary," that
she "must have known that the disability would limit [her husband's]
ability to contribute to their marital expenses," and, that, as a result,
his living expenses did not constitute the type of "unanticipated"
adverse change in circumstances that warrants a modification of plan
payments. 74 The court did not impose a family cap that categorically
prevented the debtor from using bankruptcy law to subsidize
expenses associated with a post-filing dependent. Nevertheless, the
court's reasoning is analogous to and consistent with the arguments
used to justify the welfare family cap.
E. Are Work or Eligibility Restrictions Warranted?
Means-testing, time restrictions, or family caps should be used to
prevent Group III debtors from discharging their debts in
bankruptcy. It is not clear, however, whether these restrictions
should apply to Group I or II debtors, many of whom need debt relief
for the same reasons that many welfare mothers need ongoing
financial assistance. Indeed, Congress should not radically alter
bankruptcy law to prevent people from receiving debt relief based
solely on a misguided perception of why people seem unable to pay
their bills.
Unfortunately, no one knows precisely what percentage of
people who file for bankruptcy are Group I, II, or III debtors, or are
one-time or repeat filers. Certainly, imposing means-testing, term
limits, or other eligibility caps will benefit creditors in the short-term.
171. See, e.g., H.R. 3150 §§ 102,171, 406,409.
172. 189 B.R. 748 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995).
173. See id. at 749-50.
174. Id. at 751.
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These restrictions will prevent debtors in all three Groups from
discharging at least some of their debts and, in fact, may discourage
some Group II debtors from engaging in reckless spending if they
know they can no longer erase their debts in bankruptcy.
Unfortunately, while means-testing may prevent some current debts
from being discharged, this "solution" to the bankruptcy problem will
not help creditors in the long-term if able-bodied, working class
debtors simply cannot become permanently self-sufficient due to non-
credit societal factors. In other words, while means-testing and other
eligibility caps may prevent a debtor from discharging debts in the
present, these restrictions do nothing to ensure that working class
Group I or II debtors will have the means to repay these and future
debts.
Before erecting any bars that effectively prevent Group II
debtors from discharging their debts, reformers should decide
whether Group II working poor debtors should be treated as non-
deserving simply because they exacerbated their financial
predicament by using credit irresponsibly. While the notion that
some people may never keep their word or pay their bills may offend
the American psyche, we will never solve "the bankruptcy problem"
until we correctly define it, and then attempt to remedy the
underlying economic disabilities of the working poor.
mI. Why America Should Support The Able-Bodied Working
Poor
A. Society Has Always Supported the Deserving Poor
Bankruptcy and welfare laws should provide temporary
economic relief to deserving Americans who, despite working full (or
near-full) time, find themselves unable to make ends meet. Neither
public polls nor media reports suggest that the public is unwilling to
support the truly deserving working poor. Indeed, despite the
concern that non-deserving mothers were receiving welfare benefits,
welfare was generally viewed as an entitlement program for the
deserving poor until the 1996 reforms.175 Indeed, public sentiment
expressed before Congress enacted the 1996 welfare reforms
suggested that the public felt that the government had a duty to
support the deserving poor.176 Public perception polls indicated,
175. See Cynthia R. Farina, On Misusing "Revolution" and "Reform". Procedural Due
Process and the New Welfare Act, 50 ADMIN. L. REv. 591, 618 (1998) (arguing that the
1996 welfare reforms destroyed the welfare "entitlement" because the block grant system
no longer mandates that all eligible persons are entitled to benefits).
176. See Hugh Heclo, Poverty Politics, in CONFRONTING POVERTY: PRESCRIPTIONS
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however, that the public was concerned that prior welfare laws
created a culture of poverty, a cycle of dependency, and encouraged
welfare recipients to engage in deviant behavioral patterns.177
Because the public supported giving economic relief to the truly
deserving poor, these polls not surprisingly showed that the public
wanted reforms to create a system that encouraged the importance of
work, made users self-sufficient, and ended long-term dependency -
not a system that necessarily saved money or reduced the federal
budget deficit.178
Similarly, since most Americans are not directly affected by the
increase in bankruptcy filings (since most are not creditors), the
public's concern with the bankruptcy problem seems to have little to
do with the cost of allowing debtors to discharge debts. Instead, the
public seems outraged by increased bankruptcy filings because it
concluded that non-needy, employed, able-bodied people were using
bankruptcy laws to avoid the responsibility of sacrificing to pay their
bills. As such, the public wanted a system that encouraged the
importance of paying one's bills, remedied debtors' bad credit habits,
and taught them how to avoid overextending themselves in the
future.179
FOR CHANGE 396, 400 (Sheldon H. Danziger et. al, eds. 1994) (noting that Americans
currently reject the view that "charity is a purely private duty" and agree that the
government has a duty to help those who lack the basic necessities of life); Solow, supra
note 82, at 20 ("[Mjost voters are prepared to sacrifice some private economic advantage
so that those with the very lowest earning power should not have to live at the
impoverished standard that their own wages could support.").
177. See Lawrence Bobo & Ryan A. Smith, Antipoverty Policy, Affirmative Action, and
Racial Attitudes, in CONFRONTING POVERTY: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CHANGE, 365, 368
(Sheldon H. Danziger et. al, eds., 1994). Many critics maintained that their primary goal
in reforming welfare was to end the "culture of poverty" and the poor's "cycle of
dependency" - not to save money. See Karen Hosler & Carl M. Cannon, Clinton,
Congress Close on Welfare: Election-year Pressure May Force Him to Sign Tough
Republican Bill, THE BALTIMORE SUN, July 31, 1996, at Al (noting that supporters of the
1996 welfare reform bill felt that it would free welfare recipients from the
intergenerational cycle of poverty and dependence); 142 CONG. REC. H8588 (daily ed.
July 26, 1996) (statement of Rep. Gutknecht) (encouraging President Clinton to sign the
1996 welfare bill and stressing that the bipartisan effort was "not simply trying to save
money... we are trying to save people, especially kids, from a lifetime of poverty").
178. See Boko & Smith, supra note 177 at 368; see also Solow, supra note 82, at 20
(arguing that while the public supports relief for the truly deserving, "common
observation suggests that it may be weakened by the observation that many people seem
to violate the norm of self-reliance, or by the perception that the welfare benefit is
relatively high compared with the earning power of many working citizens"); Lewis, supra
note 41, at 56 (suggesting that the public's hostility toward welfare is because of their
belief that "those who do not make it have only their own shiftlessness to blame").
179. For example, one poll indicated that most Americans believe that debtors should
be required to pay back at least some of the debts and that current laws make it too easy
for people to avoid paying their bills. See TechnoPolitics/Public Opinion Strategies Poll,
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Although Group II and III debtors may erroneously view
bankruptcy as an entitlement system,180 and some commentators have
referred to bankruptcy as a social welfare system,181 the public has
never viewed the ability to discharge ones debts as an entitlement.
Despite the differences in the perception of a person's entitlement to
welfare benefits or bankruptcy relief, current attitudes toward the
dramatic increase in bankruptcy filings during a period of relative
economic prosperity are strikingly similar to the response in 1996 to
the expanding numbers of welfare mothers who continued to "need"
public assistance.182 Despite the public's concern that non-deserving
people were receiving direct or indirect public assistance, it does not
appear to have developed a per se view that people who work but
cannot make ends meet should categorically be denied government-
provided economic relief. Indeed, the public's current resistance to
providing economic support to able-bodied debtors (or able-bodied
but unemployed welfare recipients) stems from the fear that the
debtors (and mothers) chose not to support themselves. Given this, it
is likely that the public would support allowing Group I or II debtors
to discharge their debts as long as those debtors worked full-time,
lived frugally, but still could not support themselves. Determining
whether people remain among the working class poor by choice or by
force would necessarily require reformers to reconsider the cause of
the bankruptcy problem.
B. The Importance of Correctly Defining The Bankruptcy Problem
Bankruptcy critics cannot state with any reasonable degree of
(June 18,1998) (on file with author).
180. But see United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445-46 (1973) (holding that there is no
constitutional or statutory right to bankruptcy relief).
181. See Posner, supra note 15, at 307 ("[B]ankruptcy law is analogous to the welfare
system: it is social insurance for the nonpoor. Bankruptcy law restricts credit and
establishes a minimum welfare level."). A bankruptcy professional recently referred to
bankruptcy as a "social welfare program" and a "system that provides a welfare benefit"
at a public debate on Capitol Hill. See ABI DEBATE, supra note 99, at 6. Likewise, in a
dissent to the Commission's Report, several of the Commissioners referred to bankruptcy
as "a social welfare program... subsidized by creditors." See REPORT, supra note 88,
Recommendation for Reform of Consumer Bankruptcy Law By Four Dissenting
Commissioners, at 15. See also Schlesinger, WALL ST. J. supra note 116, at Al (noting that
credit industry's characterization of bankruptcy filers as "the 1990s version of President
Reagan's 'welfare queens"').
182. This response was the White House and Congressional vow to end welfare "as we
know it." See We Offer Our People a New Choice Based on Old Values, WASH. POST, July
17, 1992, at A26 (reprint of Clinton's Democratic nomination acceptance speech); David
Whitman, War on Welfare Dependency, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 20, 1992, at 34,
37; GOP 'Contract with America,' 52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3216, 3217 (1994). See also
Barbara Vobejda, GOP Welfare Plan Would Shrink the System, WASH. POST, Dec. 7,
1994, at A23 (discussing GOP goal of ending welfare as an entitlement system).
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certainty why able-bodied, employed Americans currently cannot
seem to pay their bills. Indeed, during a debate sponsored by the
American Bankruptcy Institute, the primary participants sharply
disagreed on one fundamental question: why are more American
families using the bankruptcy system?183 One could assume that most
debtors are Group III debtors who file for bankruptcy because they
abused credit then refused to sacrifice to repay their bills. If this is
"the problem," then an easy (and probably the best) solution is to
tighten bankruptcy laws to make it harder to discharge debts and to
force debtors to participate in debt counseling to ensure they learn
how to use credit cards responsibly and conservatively. 184
But, what if this is not the problem? What if most debtors are
members of the working poor who, despite working full-time and not
spending irresponsibly, cannot make ends meet? 185 Or can make ends
meet as long as both spouses are employed, but cannot make ends
meet when one of them suddenly loses her job?186 Or can make ends
meet as long as the two wage-earners remain married, but cannot
make ends meet when they divorce and are required to maintain two
183. See ABI DEBATE, supra note 99, at 6 (statements of George Wallace and Gary
Klein). Mr. Wallace, the proponent of means-testing, argued that the increase in
consumer filings is attributable to the loss of "stigma" associated with filing for
bankruptcy. Mr. Klein, the opponent of means-testing, responded that "[t]here is no
question of stigma involved at all; people file bankruptcy because they need to file
bankruptcy." Both opinions could be construed as speculative or, at best, theoretical, as
neither debater could cite to current, comprehensive empirical evidence to support either
opinion nor did either define what would make a person "need" to file for bankruptcy.
184. See, e.g., REPORT, supra note 88, at App. G-l.a, American Bankruptcy Institute
Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Forum Report (recommending that credit bureaus record a
debtor's completion of a consumer finance education program in debtor's credit report);
but cf. Lynn M. LoPucki, Common Sense Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L..
461, 479 (1997) (proposing that participation in educational programs be limited to
debtors whose histories demonstrate a "curable" lack of understanding of budgeting and
using credit).
185. See Rebecca M. Blank, The Employment Strategy: Public Policies to Increase Work
and Earnings, in CONFRONTING POVERTY: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CHANGE 168, 171-72
(Sheldon H. Danziger, et al. eds., 1994); Marlene Kim & Thanos Mergoupis, The Working
Poor and Welfare Recipiency: Participation, Evidence, and Policy Directions, 31 J. ECON.
ISSUES 707, 711 (1997) (discussing data that show that most of the working poor hold jobs
"that are so low paid [that] even if they worked full-time and year-round, they would still
be poor" and that those jobs "offer few benefits, hold little advancement possibilities, and
have little job security"). See also Elaine Rivera et al., Hungry at the Feast: In Spite of
Prosperity and Job Growth, a New Study Warns of a Festering Crisis Among the Working
Poor, TIME, July 21, 1997, at 38 (reporting that the working poor increasingly are seeking
food from food banks).
186. See Gary Klein, Consumer Bankruptcy in the Balance: Providing an Effective
Safety Net for Overwhelmed Families, 52 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 185, 186 (1998)
(commenting on economic vulnerability of families who rely on two wage earners to make
ends meet).
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households? 187 If these factual scenarios explain the increase in
consumer bankruptcy filings, then a facile solution like "make it
harder to discharge debts" will yield no long-term benefits. Indeed,
recent government reports and statistics suggest that the bankruptcy
problem, like the welfare problem, may be tied to the working poor's
employment limitations.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics recently reported that over five
million people lived below the poverty level even though they
essentially worked full-time 88 and over four million families lived
below the poverty level even though at least one family member
participated in the labor market for over half of the year.189 Though
there is no scientific definition of the "working poor," social scientists
generally agree that members of that group work full-time for at least
part of the year (typically in low-paid jobs with limited upward
mobility), have incomes below a certain percentage of the official
poverty line, and remain poor due to shifts in technology and a
globalized economy that have increased the supply of less-skilled
workers and decreased their labor bargaining power.19°
The economic plight of the working poor generally has
deteriorated over the last two decades. Census data indicate that,
despite a strong economy and plentiful jobs, the earnings gap between
the rich and the working poor currently is the widest it has been since
World War I1191 and that jobs currently held by the working poor pay
lower wages and provide fewer benefits than those held by working
class Americans fifteen to twenty years ago.' 2 Similarly, Census data
indicate that family income for the bottom 40% of the population was
187. See id. (noting that debtors are disproportionately single parents).
188. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, A PROFILE OF THE
WORKING POOR 1996, at tbl.1 (1997).
189. See id, at tbl.6.
190. See Blank, supra note 185, at 173 (commenting that the demand for less-skilled
workers is declining faster than the number of less-skilled workers and that the increased
internationalization of the U.S. economy places American workers at a competitive
disadvantage with less-skilled (and typically lower-paid) foreign workers).
191. See HANDLER & HAsENFELD, supra note 4, at 13. See also Wages: Income
Inequality at Unprecedented Levels Imperil Social Stability, Researcher Say, BNA DAILY
LAB. REP., Apr. 11, 1997 (noting that between 1979 and 1994, the income of the poorest
20 percent of families dropped more than 11 percent, while the income of the wealthiest 20
percent of families increased by more than 24 percent); Kim & Mergouis, supra note 185,
at 719 (observing that "an increasing problem for the working poor is structural changes in
the economy that have created an ever-widening gap between the top and bottom
earners").
192. See generally Rivera, supra note 185, at 38 (noting decline in middle-income jobs
and indicating that the largest gains in job growth in recent years is in the lowest-paying
categories); Bruce W. Klein & Philip L. Rones, A Profile of the Working Poor, MONTHLY
LAB. REV. 3, 5-7 (Oct. 1989) (identifying low pay as the primary cause of poverty among
workers).
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lower in 1996 than it was in 1979 and, for that period, income for the
lowest quintile dropped from an average of $20,908 to an average of$19,680.193 Though low wage jobs account for much of the economic
disparity between the rich and the poor, the fact that these low-wagejobs are also low-benefit ones that do not provide medical insurance,
transportation stipends, or subsidized child care is perhaps the main
reason many members of the working poor find themselves unable to
move out of that socio-economic class. 194
Since many members of the working poor appear to be unable to
make ends meet even when they work full-time, it is not surprising
that sudden unemployment, or the need to shift to a lower paying job,
triggers bankruptcy filings.195 Unfortunately, rather than looking to
government data and other types of labor statistics to help define, and
craft a solution for, the bankruptcy problem, bankruptcy reform
efforts proceeded largely based on anecdotal evidence provided, and
studies funded, by a major special interest group, i.e., the credit card
industry.196 This was unfortunate both because the data was limited,
because industry-funded studies inherently are susceptible to claims
of bias, and because legislation enacted as a result of industry-funded
studies is always susceptible to claims of industry capture.197
193. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL INCOME TABLES-FAMILIES, TABLE F-
1. INCOME LIMITS FOR EACH FITH AND TOP 5 PERCENT OF FAmmS (ALL RACES):
1947 to 1996 (last modified Sept. 29, 1997)
http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/fOl.html.
194. See Jane Bryant Quinn, Managed Care Health Plans' Costs Rise, Too, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE, Apr. 12, 1998, at II, where the article observes that because employers
have "shifted more of the cost of health insurance to their employees," employees face
increased expenses at the same time their real income has decreased. The author
concludes that, since many workers cannot afford the medical plans, "the number of
uninsured people is rising by roughly one million a year."
195. See Klein, supra note 186, at 186 (observing that poor families are impacted by
instability in employment income).
196. See REPORT, supra note 88, App. G.2.a. ("Consumer Bankruptcy: Causes and
Implication"); JOHN M. BARRON & MICHAEL E. STATEN CREDIT REPORT CENTER,
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, Personal Bankruptcy: A Report on
Petitioner's Ability to Pay, Monograph #33 (October 1997); ERNST & YOUNG, L.L.P.,
CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY PETITIONERS' ABILITY TO REPAY: ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE
FROM BANKRUPTCY PETITION FILES (Feb. 1998).
197. Reforming bankruptcy law based on the results contained in studies commissioned
and paid for by a special interest group is consistent with principles associated with the
public choice theory. In general, public choice theory posits that organized special interest
groups can make campaign or other monetary contributions to politicians to ensure that
they will enact legislation that favors the special interest group even if the legislation
imposes costs on people or groups who lack the ability to organize to opposed the interest
group's proposed legislation. See Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of
American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 341-46 (1993) (suggesting that
standard public choice theory explains some bankruptcy provisions).
For a humorous account of the credit industry's recent lobbying efforts, see Molly
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Objective, comprehensive empirical data is crucial to accurately
defining and solving the bankruptcy problem. If bankruptcy
reformers can at least identify objective causes for consumer
bankruptcy filings, they may ultimately agree on the most appropriate
way to reform the bankruptcy system to stem future filings. This is
essentially what happened during welfare reform. That is, welfare
reformers had current, comprehensive data that indicated who
received welfare benefits, how long they typically received benefits,
and the types of economic crises that precipitated the need for
benefits. Due in large part to the existence of this data, liberals (who
never accepted the welfare queen stereotype) and conservatives
(some of whom seemed to think that there were nothing but welfare
queens) ultimately reached a compromise agreement on welfare
reform. While it is unclear whether the 1996 welfare reforms will ever
solve welfare mother's poverty-based problems, because the
reformers had access to comprehensive empirical data they at least
could propose reforms based on a realistic idea of the types of
mothers who most likely would need to receive temporary economic
assistance.
Admittedly, even with comprehensive, objective empirical data
similar to that available to welfare reformers, bankruptcy reformers
probably will not agree on the proper interpretation of the data, just
as welfare reformers argued over the most appropriate way to
respond to welfare data.198  Indeed, it would be surprising if
bankruptcy critics did not disagree philosophically over the best way
to interpret the data or the incentives debtors should receive to make
Ivins, Bankruptcy "Reform" Shows Pay-for-Play Strategy at Work, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
June 22, 1998, at A9, where the writer suggests that industry-funded empirical studies
"[a]mazingly often... will come out saying just what you want it to."
198. For example, while most welfare commentators agreed that some welfare mothers
had additional children after they began receiving welfare benefits, liberal and
conservative reformers disagreed over the best way to discourage this. Some supported
family caps, while others rejected this proposal citing a lack of credible data that suggests
that this would actually decrease the number of out-of-wedlock births. See Primer, supra
note 29, at 49-52.
Likewise, empirical evidence indicated that women remained on welfare because they
were single-parent heads of households. Some reformers argued that making welfare
more onerous would discourage out-of-wedlock births and encourage marriage. In
response, one commentator suggested that reformers "asked the wrong question. The
question should not be 'why are more single women having children?' The question
should be 'why aren't more women getting married?" Primer, supra note 29, at 34.
Because the data also showed that most welfare recipients are single, high school dropouts
with limited prior work experience, welfare advocates countered by arguing that the way
to prevent long-term use is to improve the educational and vocational skills of poor
mothers. See CONG. REC. H3721 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1995) (statement of Rep. Fazio)
(asserting that 45% of consumers use welfare because of divorce or separation and
stressing that only 30% entered the system as unmarried mothers).
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them conform their behavior to any given societal norm.
Nonetheless, it is imperative both for the legitimacy of the process
(and for the sake of actually implementing meaningful reform that
will help solve debtors' economic deficiencies) that bankruptcy
reformers obtain objective data that explains why people seem unable
to pay their bills.
C. The Need to Develop Humane, Rational Expectations
Finally, bankruptcy reformers must fundamentally readjust their
expectations of what reasonably can be accomplished, and how much
debtors' behavior can be altered, merely by changing bankruptcy
laws. Just as some single mothers may have become dependent on
welfare benefits, some debtors use bankruptcy to avoid accepting the
consequences of their decision to overspend on material goods they
have deemed "essential."' 199 Unfortunately, the proposed bankruptcy
reforms do nothing to discourage present consumption or to help
debtors resist the billion dollar advertising industry's lure for them to
buy, buy, buy.2°° Indeed, despite bankruptcy reforms in the 1970s and
1980s, bankruptcy commentators quickly deemed the reforms a
failure because consumers still incurred substantial debt, seemed
unable (or unwilling) to repay that debt, then sought relief in
bankruptcy all during periods of relatively stable economic growth
and while unemployment rates were low.201
199. See Ed Barna, Bankruptcies Have Another Record Year: Here's Why, VT. Bus.
MAG., Mar. 1, 1997 (commenting that the present generation feels "[w]e want the good
things and we want them now"); see generally Jackson, supra note 15, at 1405 (discussing
theories that suggest that decisions about wealth allocation are systematically biased in
favor of current consumption); see also Hirsch, supra note 113, at 207 n.97 (characterizing
proneness to over-borrow as "cultural in nature-a sequel to the rise of a consumerist
ethic that cherishes material possessions and encourages persons to favor present over
future consumption, coupled with the concurrent development of modem marketing").
200. See Jackson, supra note 15, at 1408 ("When presented with an either-or choice,
people, like animals, exhibit a tendency to choose current gratification over postponed
gratification, even if they know that the latter holds in store a greater measure of
benefits."). See also Kathryn Rem, Feeling Swamped by Sales Pitches, THE STATE
JOURNAL-REGISTER (Springfield, IL), May 31, 1998, at 21, where the author cites data
provided by the American Advertising Federation that indicates that total U.S. advertising
expenditures for 1997 were $187 billion and that Americans receive an estimated 600-1200
advertising messages each day. Aside from typical media like television and newspapers,
new media such as television monitors at gas stations, airport terminals and checkout lines
in grocery stores add to the advertising industry's "endless assault on our eyes and brains."
Id. (quoting Gary Ruskin, a consumer advocate who works with Ralph Nader).
201. Indeed, the first line of one frequently cited bankruptcy article that discussed the
then-recently enacted Bankruptcy Code was "The new bankruptcy act is a failure."
Eisenberg, supra note 147, at 953. See, e.g., Steven H. Resnicoff, Barring Bankruptcy
Banditry: Revision Of Section 523(a)(2)(C), 7 BANKR. DEV. J. 427 (1990); Lloyd D.
Cowell, Jr., Comment, The Debtor and Conversion of Nonexempt Assets to Exempt Assets
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Critics must acknowledge that both the bankruptcy and welfare
reform debates are part of a larger societal dilemma over the
importance of economic self-reliance, the changing nature of the
"traditional" family, growing economic inequality, the deterioration
of the low-wage labor market, the globalization of the American
economy, persistent poverty, and consumers' excessive spending
habits in our materialistic, credit-deluged society.
202 Unless and until
we commit to resolving these larger societal issues, we cannot
reasonably expect to solve the welfare or bankruptcy problems.
Unfortunately, neither the public, academic critics, nor Congress
seem willing to concede that some (perhaps many) debtors currently
find themselves in need of bankruptcy relief for societal reasons
wholly beyond their control.20 3 Current reformers appear to have
concluded that preventing debtors from discharging their debts will
prevent them from needing to file for bankruptcy again in the future.
This view is justified only if depriving debtors of a discharge will give
debtors adequate health insurance, will enhance their employment
opportunities, will increase their educational levels, will collect child
support payments for them, etc. Since a bankruptcy discharge does
not, and is not designed to, cure these non-credit based societal
problems, it is unlikely that merely preventing a debtor from
discharging current debts will increase the likelihood that, in the
future, the debtor will incur only those debts that he can afford to
pay.
Means-testing most likely will decrease both the current number
of bankruptcy filings and the number of cases that ultimately proceed
through bankruptcy courts. Even if it accomplishes this, however,
preventing Group I or II debtors from discharging debts may not
improve their long-term prospects for an improved standard of living
or significantly reduce the likelihood that they will again find
on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Astute Bankruptcy Estate Planning or Fraud?, 18 CAP. U. L.
REV. 567 (1989); Conrad K. Cyr, The Chapter 13 'Good Faith' Tempest: An Analysis and
Proposal for Change, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 271, 279 (1981); Elizabeth Warren, Reducing
Bankruptcy Protection for Consumers: A Response, 72 GEO. LJ. 1333, 1333 (1984);
Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective: A Rejoinder, 30 UCLA L. REV.
617,617 (1983).
202. Cf. Shuchman, supra note 89, at 443-44 (noting that some critics viewed
bankruptcy "as a social and moral problem and the process as a moral lesson" and that the
practices used to resolve this problem should punitively impress that understanding that
bankruptcy, like other social issues such as divorce and abortion, is a "grave" and
important event).
203. Indeed, making such a concession essentially would require critics to embrace a
doctrine referred to as "environmental determinism." See KELLEY, supra note 7, at 50
("The doctrine of environmental determinism held that human beings are so shaped by
their circumstances that they have no more genuine choice in the face of economic
restraints and inducements than they have in the face of literal physical force.").
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themselves in financial distress. 204 Moreover, the short-term benefits
of a reformed bankruptcy system may have devastating long-term
effects and arguments in support of means-testing fail to consider
whether denying assistance to the working poor will saddle states and
localities with the fiscal burden of supporting people who can no
longer look to federal bankruptcy laws for relief. 205 Bankruptcy
reformers need look no further than the welfare reform experience to
understand why they should temper their optimism about the results
of the current reform efforts.
Welfare was never designed to completely eradicate poverty or
to redistribute income between economic classes.206 It was, however,
designed to prevent deserving people from being forced to live in
abject poverty. Yet, as is true with bankruptcy reform, after each
prior "major" reform of the welfare system, critics soon deemed the
system a failure or disaster207 because-despite welfare-poor people
were still here. Welfare reformers, like bankruptcy reformers,
unfairly condemned each "reformed" system as a failure even though
the prior reforms were not meant to help welfare mothers collect
support payments from a non-custodial parent, obtain dependable
and affordable child care, find a higher-wage or higher-benefit job,
etc.
204. See Hon. Robert D. Martin, A Riposte to Klee, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 453,460 (1997)
("Bankruptcy at its best offers temporary relief which ought never be confused with a
cure."); cf. ELLWOOD, supra note 13, at 6, (noting that welfare "treats the symptoms of
poverty, not the causes").
205. Cf 142 CONG. REC. H9904 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996) (statement Rep. Millender-
McDonald) (predicting disastrous consequences for localities as a result of 1996 welfare
reform legislation). Because states cannot enact insolvency laws for people and most
businesses, they cannot circumvent federal bankruptcy laws by providing an alternate
method for debtors to discharge their debts. See U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2; International
Shoe Co. v- Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1929).
206. See Gary Burtless, Public Spending on the Poor: Historical Trends and Economic
Limits, in CONFRONTING POVERTY: PRESCRIPTIONS FOR CHANGE 51, 51 (Sheldon H.
Danziger, et al. eds., 1994) (observing that "the most costly social programs do not even
aim to reduce poverty as it is officially defined. They have specific objectives, such as
improving diet, basic medical care, and housing conditions, which are not measured by a
family's money income.").
207. See MELNICK, supra note 1, at 75 (describing "sense of crisis" Congress felt
concerning rising welfare costs in late 1960s); 1d. at 84-85 (recounting President Nixon's
characterization of existing welfare system as a "certain disaster"); Id. at 112 (summarizing
reform efforts during Nixon and Carter Administrations and asserting that efforts were
driven by "the pervasive sense that welfare was in crisis"); MINK, supra note 45, at 34
(commenting that welfare was reformed six times between 1967-1988); HANDLER &
HASENFELD, supra note 4, at 8 (noting repeated attempts over past 30 years to change
welfare with "major reforms"); JENCKS, supra note 19, at 204 (predicting that the Family
Support Act of 1988 would fail to save much money or move many users out of the
welfare system because there were few jobs available to the users that paid better than
welfare); ELLWOOD, supra note 13, at 10 (predicting failure for 1988 reform).
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Just as it is unrealistic to expect that the presence of low-wage,
low-benefit jobs will completely eradicate a welfare mother's poverty,
it is unrealistic to expect that a robust economy with plentiful jobs will
completely eliminate the possibility that employed, able-bodied
people will need to discharge their debts in bankruptcy. Indeed,
many suggest that the strength of the economy since the 1980s,
consumer optimism that the economy will remain strong, and credit
card companies' aggressive marketing efforts to these overly
optimistic consumers has, in fact, given consumers the incentive to
increase spending (and decrease savings).2°8 Because debtors file for
bankruptcy for a variety of reasons, it is possible that after careful
study reformers will conclude that the two historical goals of
bankruptcy laws (facilitating debt repayment and affording a fresh
start to the honest debtor) no longer provide a feasible justification
for providing debt relief to the working poor. Instead, since many
debtors appear unable to make ends meet because of changes in our
economy, we may need to consider whether bankruptcy should be
viewed as a federal public assistance or entitlement program.2°9
Certainly, bankruptcy laws are not, and have never been,
designed to redistribute income or to serve as social welfare
assistance for the working poor. Empirical data may prove, however,
that the working poor can no longer make ends meet even when they
are employed full-time. If this is true, the public should deem Group
II debtors to be deserving of bankruptcy relief even if they used credit
cards to try to support themselves or their families. That is, if Group
I or II debtors cannot reasonably be expected to support themselves
or consistently pay all their bills in the light of the fairly dramatic
changes in the U.S. labor force, then the public will need to brace
itself for the reality that unless we fundamentally redefine who is
entitled to bankruptcy relief, we may always have a "bankruptcy
problem."
Perhaps the best way to solve the bankruptcy problem is to stop
208. See Consumer Debt Rises at Weak Pace: Increase of $400 million in May Was Less
than Expected, L. A. TIMEs, July 9, 1998, at D3 (expressing concern that excessive credit
use will persist and noting accusation by the Consumer Federation of America that major
banks aggressively expanded credit card companies' activity). Scholars and economists
have commented that consumer bankruptcies can be expected to rise when consumer debt
increases and that consumer debt increases during periods of economic expansion. See
Warren, supra note 88, at 1081-82; Bhandar & Weiss, supra note 140, at 1; cf Alejandro
Bodipo-Memba & Neal Templin, Consumers Approach Holidays with Open Walle WALL
ST. J., Nov. 27, 1998, at A2 (noting consumers' concern that the global economic crisis
could affect the U.S. economy and their expectation that it will take longer than
anticipated).
209. I consider this issue in greater detail in another article. See A. Mechele Dickerson,
Bankruptcy: Public Assistance for the Working Class (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
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viewing it as a problem and accept the fact that bankruptcy filings are
the logical and natural consequences of changes in the U.S. labor
market.210 Admittedly, treating bankruptcy as a form of social
insurance that redistributes benefits from economically independent
workers to the economically dependent working poor conflicts with
the public's historical attitude toward the importance of debt
repayment and the view that public assistance recipients must make
both financial and emotional sacrifices in return for accepting public
financial assistance. If, however, we are truly committed to
permanently decreasing the need for consumer bankruptcy filings,
then we must be willing to accept the harsh reality that it is impossible
to accomplish this goal without first tackling other more controversial
societal issues.
Conclusion
As a society, we have never had great sympathy for people who
voluntarily choose to be poor or for the able-bodied working poor
because we want to believe that a healthy, employed person in this
country can work his way up the economic ladder. It is undisputed
that some debtors (like some welfare mothers) behave irresponsibly.
It is equally undisputed, however, that other debtors filed for
bankruptcy (and some mothers sought welfare benefits) for reasons
caused by external societal factors principally beyond their control.
Though the latter group deserves our sympathy, we generally have
been unwilling to deem anyone deserving of public assistance if he
has contributed to his financial downfall.
In many ways, it is easy to demonize welfare recipients and
debtors since both groups are politically weak, are not terribly
popular with the public, have few (if any) powerful or influential
lobbyists, and are stigmatized and sometimes vilified by the media
and general public 21' Though we may not like those people and may
hope that they will wake up one day economically self-sufficient, it is
210. See Shuchman, supra note 89, at 424 ("[O]ne may well speak of bankruptcy as class
legislation, and, in many respects, for accurate analysis one must break down the rights
and remedies of bankruptcy by reference to some such rough economic classification.");
cf. Lawrence H. Thompson, The Roles of Social Insurance, Tax Expenditures, Mandates,
and Means-Testing, in SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY AT THE CROSSROADS RETHINKING
THE RULES OF SOCIAL INSURANCE, TAX EXPENDITURES, MANDATES, AND MEANS-
TESTING 10-11 (Robert B. Friedland et al. eds., 1995) (commenting that, because the poor
often lack access to a good education and a decent job, welfare could be thought of as the
price we pay for not attending to these basic rights).
211. See MARMOR, supra note 4, at 80 (noting that programs for the needy, non-aged
are "often morally controversial" and lack effective lobbyists because "[c]hildren don't
vote and the poor are unorganized"); Heclo, supra note 176, at 397 (observing that the
poor have no political action committees and make no major campaign contributions).
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inevitable that someone-even during robust economic times-will
need welfare benefits or will be unable to pay all his bills.212
Bankruptcy laws, like welfare laws, should be committed to giving
working Americans a fair opportunity to participate in the economic
life of this country. Though it is politically popular to tell welfare
mothers to get a job or to tell debtors to pay their bills, it simply is not
realistic to believe that depriving the working poor of public
economic relief will make them economically self-sufficient. While
focusing on an individual's moral shortcomings allows policymakers
to avoid addressing the more politically volatile issues of labor
markets, credit lending practices, and, the lack of national health
insurance, this narrowly tailored focus will not accomplish the
ultimate goal of decreasing the number of economically dependent
citizens or reducing their need for public assistance to cure their
economic ills.
212. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. H450 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Martinez) (observing that the "eradication of poverty has confounded leaders since before
the time of Christ"). See also Posner, supra note 15, at 295 (noting that "most economists
and legal academics concede the importance or unavoidability of poor relief").
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